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 This dissertation focuses on three separate issues related to representation, institutional 
rules, and policy outcomes in the states.  Two of the three papers focus on a state-by-state 
comparison and measure how states differ in policy outcomes and descriptive representation.  
The final paper digs deeper to consider the individual-level behavior of representatives and the 
characteristics that drive those behaviors.   
First, in the study of interstate policy choices, political science scholars highlight the 
importance of variables such as divided government, regionalism, and even neighboring effects.  
I argue that the literature ignores campaign contribution laws that vary from state to state.  I 
examine previous theories along with these campaign contribution laws and find that states with 
lax campaign contribution laws are less likely to act on the regulation of payday lenders.  More 
specifically, states with lax rules act more leniently and are less likely to enact regulation of 
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payday lenders.  In addition, previous theories also prove influential in the policy choice of 
regulation within and across the states.   
Second, while one can easily imagine that larger minority populations produce more 
descriptive representation, what other state characteristics drive a state toward higher numbers of 
Black and Latino legislatures? This article responds to a debate in the literature over the role of 
professionalism in the percentage of minority legislators within a state.  I hypothesize that states 
with higher levels of professionalism attract greater numbers of qualified Black and Latino 
legislators and help these candidates win more spots within state legislatures.  The results of the 
analysis support this theory.  Along with higher percentages of minorities within a state, higher 
levels of professionalism also influence the percentage of Black and Latino legislators within a 
state.   
Finally, the third paper focuses on representation, payday lending legislation, and the 
influence of religion in legislative deliberations.  The paper focuses the dependent variable on 
roll-call votes and speaking time in favor of regulation.  The main hypotheses revolve around a 
representative’s religion.  While I hypothesize that a representative’s professed religion 
influences a representative’s willingness to speak in favor of regulation and vote for regulation, 
the results do not support the hypothesis.  I speculate on the reasons why the analysis shows no 
results for religion.  Instead, variables such as campaign contributions, committee membership, 
the electoral safety of a district, and party all influence a representative’s time spent speaking in 










This dissertation tackles three distinct issues in the Political Science literature.  One paper 
compares the differences in campaign contribution laws across the states and shows how these 
laws influence a state’s enactment of payday lending regulation.  The second paper examines the 
level of professionalism among the states and its influence on the percentage of minority 
legislators elected to state legislatures across the country.  The final paper considers religion 
alongside other individual-level characteristics of representatives in the Texas House of 
Representatives and tests religion’s impact on representatives’ activities regarding payday 
lending regulation.  The dissertation is in three-paper format, but for organizational purposes, I 
label each paper as its own chapter.     
 
Theoretical Questions and Contributions 
While these papers appear at first glance to be unrelated to each other, they are all tied 
together by one common question that can be seen in each of the papers themselves:  How do 
institutional rules and state- and legislator-level characteristics influence outcomes within and 
across states?  Each chapter attempts to answer a specific question related to the overarching 
question.   
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More specifically, Chapter 2 attempts to answer the following question:  Does the 
unevenness in campaign contribution laws across states impact the level of payday lending 
regulation states are willing to impose?  While the literature has seen many attempts to measure 
the influence of campaign contributions on the behavior of political representatives (Chappell 
1982; Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder 2002; Wawro 2001; Hall and Wayman 1990; 
Hojnacki and Kimball 2001; Austen-Smith 1995; Wright 1990; deFigueiredo and Edwards 
2007), no studies to date explore the institutional rules of a state surrounding campaign 
contributions to its elected officials.  These rules vary from state to state in important ways and 
might influence the patterns of regulation policy.  When an industry has deep pockets and is 
willing to spend to protect its jeopardized interests, states with permissible campaign 
contribution laws might place their representatives in a more vulnerable position than states with 
strict contribution rules.  While studies on individual campaign contributions may yield no 
results, a broader look may be necessary to capture the many ways to shape policy.  Politicians 
might keep an issue off the agenda, add amendments to a bill to water it down, keep it from 
reaching the floor for a vote, and so on.  A collective look at the impact of campaign 
contributions laws picks up the many ways that campaign contributions might impact regulation.            
Chapter 3 takes up the following question:  Does professionalism—defined by Squire 
(2007) as a state’s legislator salary, length of legislative session, and staff resources—drive a 
state toward higher numbers of Black and Latino legislatures?  Fiorina (1994) opens up the 
debate on how professionalism might draw candidates with certain characteristics to vie for and 
win election.   He argues that Democrats are more likely to pursue and win election in more 
professional states because they are motivated by the perks of a better salary and additional perks 
if elected.  Squire (1992) and Casellas (2009) extend the argument to Black and Latino 
3 
 
legislators, respectively, but they theorize the opposite influence of professionalism on the 
percentage of Blacks and Latinos elected to serve in state legislatures.  Squire argues that 
professionalism drives up the percentage of Black legislators; Casellas argues that Latinos as 
political newcomers cannot compete in more professional legislatures, thereby arguing that less 
professional legislatures elect higher percentages of Latinos.  I, instead, argue that higher levels 
of professionalism should drive up the percentage of both Blacks and Latinos in state 
legislatures.  I argue in the opposite direction of Casellas.  I argue that Latinos often come from 
Latino-heavy districts, where their chances of winning election are great.  If chances of winning 
are great, then the final motivation for these legislators comes from the benefits of a more 
professional legislature.  Specifically, as a state legislature’s professionalism increases, I 
hypothesize that the increase in professionalism will also increase the percentage of minority 
legislators within a state’s legislature.  Professionalism provides the incentive to win a seat in the 
legislature.  This argument falls closer in line with Fiorina’s (1994) argument on Democrats and 
professionalism and Squire’s (1992) argument on Black legislators and professionalism.  I add to 
those discussions, though, by considering the impact of minority concentrations within districts.  
I also add to it by considering the impact of the Voting Rights Act on the percentage of 
minorities elected within each state.             
Chapter 4 attempts to answer this question:  Does religion drive representatives to 
support calls for payday lending regulation?  Fenno (1977) writes that members of Congress 
work hard to project a certain image to constituents, to build up trust and rapport with 
constituents, and to strengthen and broaden their reelection circle.  I argue that this certainly 
extends to religion.  When groups from the constituency signal that an issue is important, as the 
religious community did on the issue of payday lending during the Texas House of 
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Representatives’ 2011 session, those state legislators professing a religion become an easy target 
for religious constituents.  These representatives must provide support to the religious 
community or lose trust within the community due to an inconsistency between image and 
behavior.  The discussion in Chapter 4 adds to the representation literature by considering yet 
another aspect of descriptive representation.  When a representative purports to be a part of a 
certain group, expectations and responsibilities are often attached to that group membership.  
Religious constituents may look to representatives with the same professed religion for a shared 
group consciousness.  They may view this representative as someone who might fight hard for 
issues important to the religion.         
 
Organization 
The following serves as a summary of the findings and the layout for the rest of the 
dissertation: 
Chapter 2 focuses on a study of interstate policy choices.  Political science scholars 
highlight the importance of variables such as divided government, regionalism, and even 
neighboring effects.  I argue that the literature ignores campaign contribution laws that vary from 
state to state.  I examine previous theories along with these campaign contribution laws and find 
that states with lax campaign contribution laws are less likely to act on the regulation of payday 
lenders.  More specifically, states with lax rules act more leniently and are less likely to enact 
regulation of payday lenders.  I do this by using an event history analysis to examine policy, state 
characteristics, and institutional rules during the period of 2000-2013.  I conduct a secondary 
analysis to test the strictness of a state’s regulation and find that strict campaign contribution 
rules also produce stricter payday lending regulations.  In both models, previous theories also 
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prove influential in the policy choice of regulation within and across the states.  For example, 
divided government impacts policy, and the variable measuring percentage of neighbors with 
payday regulation influences the behavior of neighboring states in at least one of the models.     
Chapter 3 considers a the professionalism of a state’s legislature and its influence on the 
percentage of minority legislators serving in each state.  While one can easily imagine that larger 
minority populations produce more descriptive representation, what other state characteristics 
drive a state toward higher numbers of Black and Latino legislatures? This chapter responds to a 
debate in the literature over the role of professionalism in the percentage of minority legislators 
within a state.  I hypothesize that states with higher levels of professionalism attract greater 
numbers of qualified Black and Latino legislators and help these candidates win more spots 
within state legislatures.  The results of the analysis support this theory.  Along with higher 
percentages of minorities within a state, higher levels of professionalism also influence the 
percentage of Black and Latino legislators within a state.   
Chapter 4 focuses on representation, payday lending legislation, and the influence of 
religion in legislative deliberations.  The chapter focuses the dependent variables on roll-call 
votes and speaking time in favor of regulation.  I use data from the 2011 legislative session of the 
Texas House of Representatives to analyze speaking time and roll-call votes of state 
representatives.  The main hypotheses revolves around a representative’s religion.  While I 
hypothesize that a representative’s professed religion influences a representative’s willingness to 
speak in favor of regulation and vote for regulation, the hypothesis is not supported by the 
results.  I speculate on the reasons why the analysis shows no results for religion.  Instead, 
variables such as campaign contributions, committee membership, the electoral safety of a 
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district, and party all influence a representative’s time spent speaking up and voting in favor of 
regulation.     
Finally, Chapter 5 sums up the conclusions drawn when considering the previous three 
chapters together.  I also take the opportunity to discuss the direction of future research in light 
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Payday Lending Laws vs. Campaign Contribution Laws:  An 





 Payday lending has been the focus of much regulatory attention at all levels of American 
government due to its high fees, interest rates, and rollover rates.  The industry, though, has 
aggressively fought against regulation through trade associations, lobbyists, and campaign 
contributions.  One Americans for Financial Reform report (2015) states that lenders spent $15 
million during the 2013-2014 election cycle alone to protect their interests in Congress.  The 
payday lending story begins at the state level, however, as this level has been unafraid to regulate 
payday lending activities within its own boundaries.  These lenders have also shown a 
willingness to spend at that level, too.  One report (Texans for Public Justice 2011), for example, 
shows that payday lenders contributed $1.4 million to Texas legislators during the 2010 election 
cycle.  Still, payday lending regulation across the states remains uneven.  Some states prohibit 
payday lending within their borders while others allow it to continue unrestricted.  My research 
explores the reasons behind this uneven adoption of regulation and incorporates an analysis of 
campaign contribution laws across the states, an analysis currently missing in today’s policy 
discussion.   
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In the United States, the fifty states set up an important policy comparison because the 
states vary in their political characteristics and certainly in their policy outcomes across 
jurisdictions.  Many studies debate and explore the determinants of policy outcomes across 
jurisdictions and point to variables such as population size, wealth, divided state government, 
professionalism, and regionalism as influential in a state-to-state comparison (for example, see 
Walker 1969; Gray 1973; Andrews 2000; Huber and Shipan 2002; Shipan and Volden 2006; 
McCann, Shipan, and Volden 2015).  These studies push the literatures on policy adoption and 
diffusion forward.     
 Unfortunately, the discussion to date has not considered the influence of campaign 
contributions and the laws surrounding these political donations.  With a policy issue such as 
payday lending, one can easily imagine that private enterprise might pull out all the stops to 
protect its interests.  These payday lenders have already shown how they are willing to contribute 
to campaigns.  The problem becomes that they might be restricted from giving in some 
jurisdictions but permitted to give freely in others.  Does the unevenness in campaign 
contribution laws impact the level of regulation states are willing to impose?  I am unaware of 
any studies in policy adoption and diffusion that take up this angle.  Instead, the literature 
surrounding contributions focuses the attention of campaign contributions on the behavior of 
individual legislators within state legislatures and Congress.  While Wawro (2001) finds no 
influence between campaign contributions and roll-call votes, other scholars find that these 
campaign contributions sway legislative activities other than roll-call votes in a contributor’s 
desired direction (Hall and Wayman 1990; Hojnacki and Kimball 2001; Austen-Smith 1995; 
Wright 1990; deFigueiredo and Edwards 2007),.  To understand campaign contributions further, 
this study begins at the source—the actual campaign contribution laws, the lever that controls the 
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flow of contributions.  I place this story within the literature of policy adoption in order to 
explore this novel angle.   
 I focus my attention on the campaign contribution laws within each state and their ability 
to influence the enactment of payday lending regulation within each state.  Specifically, I argue 
that lax campaign contribution laws lead to a lesser likelihood that a state will intervene with 
regulation of payday lenders.  These states are easy targets for industry’s contributions and are, 
thus, more susceptible to industry wishes.  Indeed, the results support this hypothesis.  States 
with the strictest campaign contribution laws have a greater likelihood of enacting tighter 
regulation of the industry and coming down harder on payday lenders.  In addition, I find further 
support for the importance of unified Democratic government.  Finally, I find influence coming 
from a state’s business climate, the percentage of women legislators, and the impact of the 
percentage of neighboring state adopters.  The following two sections outline 1) a history of 
payday lending in America and 2) the importance of these campaign contribution laws and how 
they relate to policy adoption.   
 
Payday Lending 
 Payday lenders are the storefronts around America that provide cash advances to 
consumers until their next payday.  While payday lenders defend their role in the economy by 
explaining that they provide lending services to customers that cannot secure a loan through 
traditional lenders, critics attack these lenders due to their high interest rates, the cycle of debt 
created by the ability to roll over the loan, and the short time frame lenders have to pay off the 
debt (Wolff 2012).  In addition, in this same report, the Center for Responsible Lending, one of 
the authoritative organizations on payday lending policy and one of the industry’s staunchest 
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critics, reports that payday lenders locate their businesses in impoverished neighborhoods and 
target the poor as their clientele.   
Payday lenders view this lending as lucrative, which is evidenced by their recent 
expansion across the United States.  One Federal Reserve report details the explosion of the 
industry from 2,000 payday lending stores in 1996 to approximately 24,000 by 2007 (Prager 
2009).  To put this number in perspective, McDonald’s, the second largest fast-food chain in the 
United States behind Subway, currently has 14,157 storefronts (Federal Reserve 2014).  In 
addition, as mentioned above, the $15 million the industry spent on lobbying in Congress in one 
year alone shows just how lucrative they find their practices.  They are ready and willing to 
spend millions in order to defend their interests.  For purposes of my analysis, I focus on the time 
frame after 2000, when the industry saw the great explosion of both business and regulation.  
The explosive growth after 2000 also means that payday lenders began receiving much attention 
from lawmakers across the country.  The Center for Responsible Lending, for example, sounded 
the alarm, and states across the nation responded to the call to action.  Payday lenders, intent on 
keeping their main business activity, also responded by opening their wallets and defending their 
activities.  Clashes between state governments, consumer advocates, and the payday lending 
ensued.  This regulatory issue sets up the scenario for a study of policy adoption across the states 
and campaign contribution laws’ role within those processes.       
 
Campaign Contributions, Their Limits, and Their Influence on Policy Adoption 
 
Numerous political science studies show that campaign contributions do not matter in 
roll-call votes.  Study after study shows little to no connection between campaign contributions 
and roll-call votes (Chappell 1982; Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder 2002).  In one 
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comprehensive study, Wawro (2001) examines the relationship between campaign contributions 
and roll-call votes.  He uses a model to better account for legislator predispositions and finds that 
contributions from political action committees have no real influence on the roll-call votes of 
members of Congress.  Given the amount of attention campaign contributions receive in the 
literature, the media, and the halls of legislatures across the country, this conclusion might 
surprise Americans.  The conclusion might even drive special interests to stop giving to 
campaigns.  After all, if my interests are not served by my representatives, what is my incentive 
to continue giving?           
Still, Americans across the country continue to give in spite of the mounting evidence 
that campaign contributions go unrewarded.  Business interests, special interest groups, and 
private citizens give generously each year.  The National Conference of State Legislatures (2016) 
reports that state candidates raise over $3 billion in campaign contributions from political action 
committees and individuals.  The amount of money is staggering, and a great paradox exists 
between the amount of campaign contributions and much of political science’s assumption of 
self-interest as a driver of political motivation.    The incompatibility between contribution and 
reward nudges the literature to continue in search of a motive, a reason for special interests and 
private citizens to continue giving.       
Some studies push the literature to look for a different smoking gun than simply roll-call 
votes.  Sure enough, several studies show that campaign contributions buy a variety of political 
activity from politicians. Scholars find that these campaign contributions sway legislative 
activities other than roll-call votes in a contributor’s desired direction (Hall and Wayman 1990; 
Hojnacki and Kimball 2001; Austen-Smith 1995; Wright 1990; deFigueiredo and Edwards 
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2007).  These nuanced explanations show the influence campaign contributions exert on the 
political process.      
Campaign finance reformers recognize the continued dangers associated with campaign 
contributions.  Political bodies across the United States work year after year to place limits on 
the amount or types of these campaign contributions.  These political actors, the ones closest to 
the giving of these campaign contributions, worry about the threat these gifts pose to 
government. Campaign contributions can exert influence on the many different activities within 
a legislature.  The political process is also a long one, with many different points of entry 
through which to exert that influence.  All these activities and points of entry deserve careful 
attention.      
More recent studies explore the connection between campaign contributions and political 
outcomes.  Some studies have been able to link greater campaign contributions from businesses 
to lightened regulation.  DeFigueiredo and Edwards (2007), who move beyond roll call votes to 
the relationship between campaign contributions and the prices set by a state’s 
telecommunications regulatory commission, find that contributions influence the rates new 
telecommunications companies must pay to enter into competition.  In states where existing 
telecommunications companies give generously to legislators, the barrier to entry for new 
companies is high.  When new entrants give generously, the cost associated with entering a 
state’s telecommunications market is low. 
In addition, Fellowes and Wolf (2004) find that campaign contributions from business 
interests sway Congress’s actions toward more favorable tax and regulatory votes instead of 
direct expenditures for business interests.  Their study introduces two important changes to the 
way political science once viewed the campaign contributions-to-vote exchange.  First, they take 
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a look at individual campaign contributions and not just PAC contributions.  These individuals 
are associated within a particular industry and have enough self-interest to give on behalf of the 
industry.  Second, while they still use roll-call votes, they clarify that political science should 
consider tax and regulatory votes, not direct expenditures.  They argue that direct expenditures 
create an ethical dilemma, one for which politicians could face legal consequences.  Instead, they 
argue that campaign contributions should be gauged against tax and regulatory bills, areas where 
business would still have an interest but where politicians could not necessarily get in trouble for 
the connection.      
Payday lending sits perfectly at the nexus of all of these debates within the literature.  
First, payday lenders are interested in creating a regulatory environment through which they can 
operate their businesses.  They are not interested in direct government expenditures and, thus, do 
not risk placing themselves into an ethical dilemma over a pay-to-play scenario.  Second, their 
interests are still easily identified, though.  Unlike banks or other businesses, payday lenders only 
serve one function—lending money to consumers—and serve no governmental interest.  With 
only one real function, any bill targeting these lenders becomes easy to spot.  For the most part, 
government’s interest in getting involved is to regulate the industry.  Payday lenders are firmly 
against regulation.  Third, by focusing on the direct regulation of the industry, I pull the 
discussion away from roll-call votes and onto another way through which campaign 
contributions might influence the political process.  While DeFigueiredo and Edwards (2007) 
and Fellowes and Wolf (2004) look at regulation from the agency standpoint and a different set 
of roll-call votes, respectively, I look at states’ level of regulation passed by the states.           
Finally, and most importantly, what is missing completely from the campaign 
contributions story is the uneven contribution limits across the states.  The story is currently 
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about the amount of contributions given to a candidate.  While many campaign contribution 
studies focus on Congress, only a few do not.  I turn my focus to the internal characteristics of a 
state and introduce a new institutional rule into the policy adoption discussion.  States vary in 
their campaign contribution rules.  I identify campaign contribution rules within a state as one of 
the missing variables within the policy adoption literature.  If political science spends so much 
time contemplating how campaign contributions impact legislative behavior, should the 
discipline also spend time focused on the contribution laws and limits themselves?  The states 
have different limits and laws, which sets up an excellent test for the ways these laws and limits 
might impact policy across the different states.  A thorough review of the policy adoption 
literature yields no considerations of campaign contributions laws’ role in the adoption of policy. 
Here, I must pause and describe the difference between campaign contributions at the 
individual level and campaign contribution laws at the collective level.  Many of the studies cited 
above point to a very high likelihood that campaign contributions have no influence on the 
actions of individual legislators.  The problem with these studies is that they only capture one of 
the elements that might be influenced by campaign contributions.  Instead, the collective level, 
the laws themselves, allows this study to consider the many ways that campaign contributions 
might keep a state from enacting regulation.  Campaign contributions might keep a bill off the 
agenda entirely, prevent a bill from getting a hearing, encourage amendments to weaken a bill, 
prevent the bill from coming up for a vote on the floor, etc.  Campaign contribution laws provide 
a collective space where any of these activities might take place.  It does not narrowly tailor the 
campaign contributions story to only one of the potential consequences, like contribution’s 
influence on roll-call votes.   
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A few studies look at the impact of campaign contributions at the state level.  Bender 
(2013) and Powell (2012) show that campaign contributions at the state level vary in ways 
different than Congress due to a variety of institutional rules and clearly influence the behaviors 
of legislators, their policy choices, and electoral outcomes.     
These studies show that much can be learned by studying campaign contributions at the 
state level.  The discipline, though, fails to identify that the laws and the limits imposed by each 
state should begin any discussion of campaign contributions at the state level.  These laws and 
limits also deserve a permanent place in the policy adoption literature.  These campaign 
contribution laws are especially important because payday lenders have already been shown to 
give generously in order to their interests in the halls of government.  With payday loans serving 
as their only business activity, protecting their business interests through campaign contributions 
is critical.  They will have more opportunity to protect those interests in states with lax campaign 
contribution laws.  They cannot be influenced as much by campaign contributions.  For example, 
Utah, a state with no caps on the amount of interest, is a state that allows corporate campaign 
contributions and high levels of political action committee contributions.  This environment 
gives payday lenders, with their deep pockets, greater opportunities to sway legislators.  Even the 
Deseret News (2015), a newspaper owned by the conservative Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, wrote an article against the debt trap of payday loans and pointed blame toward the 
campaign-finance environment:  “But it also speaks to the lobbying clout of the payday loan 
industry, which has been known to shower key politicians with healthy campaign contributions.”  
In contrast, North Carolina, a state that prohibits payday loans altogether, is also a state that 
severely limits the types of campaign contributions might make.  Legislators are less likely to fall 
victim to the enticements of campaign contributions and may, instead, take seriously consumer 
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advocates, who are more contributions-poor but still on a more level playing field in a state such 
as North Carolina.   
Consider the following scenarios within States A and B.  State A with lax contribution 
laws allows payday lenders to give generously to members of the legislature.  These payday 
lenders are willing to give generously because their one and only business function is at stake.  
As these payday lenders continue giving generously to legislators, these lawmakers then feel a 
sense of obligation to at least hear out the interests of their donors.  By accepting these funds, 
legislators signal to donors that they are willing to entertain their thoughts.  These campaign 
contributions drown out the calls, visits, and other activities from cash-poor consumer advocates, 
who just cannot compete with monetary donations.  State A creates a situation in which even the 
most consumer-friendly legislator is enticed by the carrot offered by payday lenders.  Campaigns 
are driven by money, and with a higher ceiling for campaign contributions, State A pushes its 
legislators to chase money.  Otherwise, these dollars go to competitors.     
The legislator aims to please donors because these funds helped secure victory during the 
election.  Support from the legislator includes a vote against regulation, efforts to water down 
legislation, a vote for the watered-down legislation, efforts to block a vote, and attempts to keep 
regulation from even coming to a vote.  There are many ways to show support, even if we often 
think of roll-call votes as the only way.  Continued support means that the legislator can continue 
receiving the support from the deep pockets of payday lenders.  This translates to better chances 
for reelection.   
Aggregated up from the legislator to the legislature, State A sees campaign contributions 
going to many of its legislative members.  These legislators collectively opt for no regulation of 
the industry or, in case legislators wish to seem responsive, watered-down versions of regulation.  
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These bills act as mere smokescreens, keeping consumer advocates at bay for another legislative 
session and payday lenders in their campaign-contribution pockets.  Bottom line, though, is that 
payday lenders continue being served favorably by the campaign contributions laws, which give 
payday lenders a carrot to wield to the contributions-hungry legislator.          
  State B, on the other hand, offers a more level playing field to consumer advocates and 
payday lenders.  The contributions divide is nowhere near as pronounced as State A because 
State B’s contribution laws set strict limits on the amounts legislators can receive.  Consumer 
advocates often do not have the funds to donate.  Limiting the ability of contributors to donate 
pulls payday lenders closer to consumer advocates.  Campaign contributions do not serve as 
much of an enticement because the amounts payday lenders are willing to give can be matched 
by many other contributors, no matter the policy issue.  The carrot is the same size as all the 
other carrots offered up by contributors and, thus, does not hold the same appeal as State A’s 
situation.  State B’s consumer advocates have a less weakened position among stakeholders.  
While advocates may not have the resources to contribute much to campaigns, state contribution 
laws narrow the monetary divide between regulation advocates and payday lenders.   
Collectively, State B’s legislature depends less on the deepest pockets, those with both 
the resources and the willingness to give.  Payday lenders fit both criteria.  While state 
legislatures all grapple with the various stakeholders and the need for campaign contributions, 
State B places less emphasis on big contributions and less power in the contributors’ hands.  
They cannot force State B to pay attention to their interests in the same way as State A.  Both 
payday lenders and consumer advocates receive an equalized place at the bargaining table.  The 
stricter campaign contribution laws free up State B to make the more difficult decisions without 
campaign contributions serving as much of a consideration as they do in State A’s scenario.   
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While State A may be incentivized to protect the interests of its donors, State B’s 
legislature feels less restricted. State B may pass tighter regulation against payday lenders 
because contribution laws render campaign contributions less powerful in punishing legislators 
during the next election cycle.                  
This void in the literature and the development of this theory set up the following 
hypotheses: 
 
Campaign Contributions Rules Hypothesis:  State that impose stricter rules on 
campaign contributions will be more likely to impose regulation on payday lenders.       
Campaign Contributions Rules Strictness Hypothesis:  States that impose stricter limits 
on campaign contributions will see an increase in the strictness of regulation they impose 
on payday lenders.  
 
These two hypotheses require separate tests.  I next lay out the data and methods that will be 
used to test these two hypotheses.   
 
Data and Methods for Campaign Contributions Rules Hypothesis 
Given the two hypotheses, I conduct two separate analyses to test the ideas set forth in 
both of them.  I detail the data and methods separately below.  First, I am interested in the 
likelihood of regulation through the period 2000-2013, the years in which payday storefronts 
exploded throughout the United States.  These are also the years in which states responded with 
regulation of the industry.  Event history analysis is the most common approach to the study of 
policy across the states, and this analysis provides the main test for the data analyzed here. 
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Boehmke (2009) points out that event history analysis is the “standard approach to modeling 
state policy innovation” (p. 229).  This approach works out perfectly because I am interested in 
testing my hypothesis of campaign contributions rules by state during the years between 2000-
2013.   
Using data from the Center for Responsible Lending (2013) and the National Conference 
of State Legislatures (2013), I construct state-years for all the states during the period 2000-2013.  
This state-year dependent variable is a dichotomous variable and takes on a value of zero until 
the state manages to enact regulation that limits, effectively eliminates, or prohibits payday 
lending.  Both the Center for Responsible Lending and the National Conference of State 
Legislatures code the regulation laws and determine when a state enacts regulation.  Table 2.1 
describes which states ever enact legislation.  The “Payday Regulation” column of Table 2.1 
shows the years of adoption; states with no adoption have dashes in this column.  The state takes 
a value of one during the year it enacts regulation and drops out of the analysis in subsequent 
years.  Twenty-one states enact laws that effectively regulate payday lenders, but only fourteen 
of these enact legislation during the period from 2000-2013.  I drop six of these twenty-one 
states from the analysis completely and partially leave another in the model.  Six of them enact 
legislation before 2000, using old usury laws passed many years before 2000 to regulate these 
payday lenders.  One state, Arkansas, used a previous constitutional clause, written years before 
2000, to eliminate payday lending in 2008.1  The attorney general used the clause to justify the 
prohibition of payday lending, and its state Supreme Court argued in the attorney general’s favor.  
I leave Arkansas in the model, assigning it zeroes for the years 2000-2007.  It drops out of 
                                                          
1 To test Arkansas’ influence, I ran the model two other ways.  In one, I omitted Arkansas entirely, and in the other, 
I acted as if the Arkansas legislature enacted regulation.  In both models, campaign contribution laws behaved the 
way they do in the results presented below.  In addition, Arkansas’ changes in both alternate models helped the 
variable measuring the percentage of neighbors with regulation achieve statistical significance.   
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subsequent years without ever taking on a value of one.  This leaves in the analysis fourteen 
states with regulation and thirty states with no regulation.       
Table 2.1.  States, Their Regulation of Payday Lenders, and Their Campaign Contribution Laws, 2000-2013 
(States in gray are strictest in their campaign contribution laws and take on a value of zero for most or all of event history analysis.  These states ban 
corporate contributions and do not allow PACs to contribute $5,000 or more) 
State Payday Regulation Ban on Corporate Contributions Do Not Allow PAC Contributions of $5,000 or More 
Alabama -- Allows Allows 
Alaska -- Pre-2000 Pre-2000 
Arizona 2008 Pre-2000 Pre-2000 
Arkansas 2008* Allows Pre-2000 
California -- Allows Allows 
Colorado 2010 2002 Pre-2000 
Connecticut Pre-2000** Pre-2000 Pre-2000 
Delaware 2013 Allows Pre-2000 
Florida -- Allows Pre-2000 
Georgia 2004 Allows Pre-2000 
Hawaii -- Allows Pre-2000 
Idaho -- Allows Pre-2000 
Illinois -- Allows Allows 
Indiana -- Allows Allows 
Iowa -- Pre-2000 Pre-2000 
Kansas -- Allow Pre-2000 
Kentucky -- Pre-2000 Pre-2000 
Louisiana -- Allows Allows 
Maine 2005 Allows Pre-2000 
Maryland 2002 Allows Allows 
Massachusetts Pre-2000** Pre-2000 Pre-2000 
Michigan -- Pre-2000 Allows 
Minnesota -- Pre-2000 Pre-2000 
Mississippi -- Allows Allows 
Missouri -- Allows Allows 
Montana 2010 Pre-2000 Pre-2000 
Nebraska -- Allows Allows 
Nevada -- Allows Allows 
New Hampshire 2008 Allows Allows 
New Jersey Pre-2000** Allows Allows 
New Mexico -- Allows Allows 
New York Pre-2000** Allows Pre-2000 
North Carolina 2001 Pre-2000 Pre-2000 
North Dakota -- Pre-2000 Allows 
Ohio 2008 Pre-2000 Pre-2000 
Oklahoma -- Pre-2000 Allows 
Oregon 2007 Allows Allows 
Pennsylvania Pre-2000** Pre-2000 Allows 
Rhode Island -- Pre-2000 Pre-2000 
South Carolina -- Allows Pre-2000 
South Dakota -- Pre-2000 Allows 
Tennessee -- 2000-2011 Allows 
Texas -- Pre-2000 Allows 
Utah -- Allows Allows 
Vermont Pre-2000** Allows Pre-2000 
Virginia 2008 Allows Allows 
Washington 2009 Pre-2000 Pre-2000 
West Virginia 2005 Pre-2000 Pre-2000 
Wisconsin -- Pre-2000 Pre-2000 
Wyoming -- Pre-2000 Allows 
*Arkansas begins regulating payday lenders in 2008 through actions of the attorney general.  They remain in the event history analysis through 2007 but 
do not receive credit in 2008 for taking action through the legislature.  In other words, they never get a “1” in 2008.  They simply drop out of the 
analysis.   
**States with regulation laws on the books before 2000 are excluded from the analysis. 




To examine if campaign contribution laws influence the likelihood of regulation, I 
analyze each state’s limits on contributions to candidates during the period in question.  This 
variable serves as the independent variable of interest.  The National Conference of State 
Legislatures (2013) and the Federal Election Commission (2016) provide these limits.  I first 
analyze the data to find out the states that do and do not prohibit corporate contributions.2  
Second, because these lenders may choose to give donations through their political action 
committees in addition to their corporate contributions, I measure whether a state allows for 
donations of $5,000 or more to lower legislative members (i.e. the house members of most 
states).  I wish to identify those states with the strictest campaign contribution laws.  
Corporations often give through political action committees that represent either the business or 
the industry.  Payday lenders have several different political action committees, including the 
Online Lenders Alliance, the Community Financial Services Association, the American 
Financial Services Association, and the National Installment Lenders Association (Americans for 
Financial Reform 2015).  Those that allow campaign contributions from corporations or allow 
for $5,000 or more to be given to lower-chamber legislative members take on a value of one.  
Those that prohibit campaign contributions and only allow for less than $5,000 to lower-chamber 
legislative members take on a value of zero.  The states that take on a value of zero (the strictest 
campaign contribution laws) are represented in gray in Table 2.1.  In essence, states with a value 
of one have relaxed rules on campaign contributions and will have less regulation on payday 
                                                          
2 In the measurement of my campaign contributions variable, I only consider those states that ban corporate 
contributions entirely.  I am most interested in finding the states with the strictest campaign contribution laws.  
Some state allow unlimited corporate campaign contributions, and other states allow these contributions but limit 
the amount of the donation.  I only consider the ban because I believe that any donation from a corporation may 
make legislators and legislatures sympathetic to payday lenders, no matter the amount.   
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lenders. Conversely, states with a value of zero have very strict rules surrounding the ways in 
which a corporation might give campaign contributions.   
Only fourteen states take on a value of zero for strict campaign contribution laws.  A 
careful study of the Federal Election Commission and the National Conference of State 
Legislatures’ data shows that these states remain firmly in one camp or the other.  Only one state, 
Colorado, moves from one category to the other during the fourteen years in question.  I account 
for this movement by giving Colorado a one between 2000-2001 (years in which the state 
permits corporate donations) and a zero between 2002-2013 (years in which the state bans 
corporate contributions and has low PAC contribution limits).  Tennessee dropped its ban on 
corporate contributions in 2011, but its law of allowing PACs to give $5,000 or more already had 
the state in the category with a value of one.  Thus, the state did not change value at all.  The 
states and their respective values for each category of campaign contribution are listed in Table 
2.1 in the last rows included in the table.   
 
Control Variables 
In addition to states’ campaign contribution laws, I identify factors that are important in 
the policy literature and that might be relevant to the story explained here.  I include these 
variables in the analyses in order to control for their influence.  Below, I explain the way I 
measure variables for the event history analysis.  I allow all variables in the event history 
analysis to take on its particular value for each specific state-year.    
I create one variable to control for the percentage of neighbors that actually enact payday 
regulation.  While my study is mainly about policy adoption and the internal characteristics of a 
state, I utilize this variable because the extensive literature shows that external influences matter, 
24 
 
too.  The literature, for example, shows that subnational governments learn from each other, 
emulate each other, and compete against each other (Walker 1969; Gray 1973; Berry and Berry 
1990; Haider-Market 2001; Balla 2001; Shipan and Volden 2006, 2008).  I use the Center for 
Responsible Lending report (Montezemolo 2013) to identify the twenty-one states that have 
either eliminated or limited payday lending through legislative action.  I then tally for each state 
the number of adjacent states that have enacted regulation on the payday lending industry.  I 
define adjacent as a state that touches the other state’s borders, no matter how long the shared 
border is.  I then divide that number of state regulators by the total number of states that border 
the state to arrive at the percentage of neighbors with strict payday lending regulation.  In the 
event history analysis, the percentage of state’s neighbors with payday regulation grows the year 
after a state enacts the regulation.  I expect that states with high percentages of neighbor adopters 
will follow the lead of its neighbors and will be more likely to enact regulation.   
Passing policy is no easy feat, but divided government often makes passage of such 
policy even more difficult.  Following the lead of several scholars (for example, see Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1994, 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002), I attempt to measure the costs of divided 
government on policy outcomes.  More specifically, I measure likelihood of regulation in the 
face of potential conflict between different legislative chambers and the governor.  This variable 
also provides a measure of party.  I use information from the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (2015) and the National Governors Association (2015) to uncover the party in 
control from 2000 to 2013.  I assign a value of one to each state-year in which a state has unified 
Democratic control of a state’s legislative chambers and governorship.  All other party pairings 
of state government receive a zero.  The assumption here is that unified Democrats would be 
more likely to regulate than Republicans.  Another important note is that Nebraska is not 
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dropped from the analysis even though it has a unicameral, nonpartisan legislature.  The reason 
is because its governors during this period of time are Republican, which would automatically 
give it a value of zero.  This allows for a full analysis of all fifty states.   
A state’s business climate also might influence a state’s willingness to enact regulation of 
payday lenders.  I use a measure developed by the Tax Foundation (2016) to examine the 
business climate during this time period.  The index takes into consideration the state’s tax 
system and gauges how hospitable the system is to economic growth and business development.  
The scores for each state range on a scale from zero to ten, with ten being more hospitable for 
business purposes.  The values for each state-year vary based on the score assigned to them by 
the Tax Foundation that particular year.  The higher the score, the less likely a state will be 
willing to regulate payday lenders.       
The Center for Responsible Lending (Li, Parrish, Ernst, and Davis 2009) reports that 
payday lenders are eight times more likely to be concentrated in neighborhoods with a large 
percentage of Blacks and Latinos.  Due to a shared group consciousness based on race, as 
evidenced by its place in the literature (Dawson 1995; Hutchings 1997; Whitby 1997; 
Mansbridge 1999; Minta 2009), the racial composition of a state and its legislature may play a 
role in regulation.  Complete data for the percentages of minorities serving in state legislatures is 
not readily available.  Instead, I use Census (2016) data to calculate the percentage of Black and 
Latinos within a state.  Since several scholars (for example, Squire 1992; Casellas 2009) find that 
a state’s percentage of minorities greatly influences the amount of minorities serving in 
legislatures, one acts as a good proxy for the other to show how their interests might be 
represented in the legislature.  I expect higher percentages to lead to a greater likelihood of 
regulation intervention.   
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Likewise, Texas Appleseed (Baddour 2009) reports that a Texas survey of payday 
borrowers revealed that 59% of all payday borrowers were women, with many of them being 
single mothers.  These loans seem to disproportionately affect women, especially the most 
vulnerable amont them.  I use data from the Center for American Women and Politics (2016) to 
measure the percentage of women in each state’s legislature.  The data is available for each year 
and each state between the years 2000-2013.  I include percentages for each state-year in the 
event history analysis.  I expect to see a higher likelihood of payday lending regulation in states 
with a higher proportion of women serving in the state legislature.  These women will serve as 
advocates for regulation.       
In addition, I include a dummy variable for Southern states.  While scholars have shown 
less differences between the South and other regions recently, differences still exist in ways that 
might skew this study of policy consequences (Black 1987; Hood, Kidd, and Morris 1999; 
Berard 2001).  I expect to see a lower likelihood of payday lending regulation coming out of 
these states.   
 
 Results for Campaign Contributions Rules Hypothesis 
 The results of the event history analysis lend great support to the campaign contributions 
rules hypothesis, even when controlling for other variables.3  I report out the hazard ratio of the 
event history analysis.  The model starts with a baseline of one, the point at which any value of a 
state-year would be just as likely as the next to adopt regulation in the next state-year.  If a value 
                                                          
3 I re-ran the event history analysis with the six dropped states (those states with payday regulation in place before 
2000), giving them a one for payday regulation at the beginning of the event history analysis.  I also gave Arkansas 
a value of one during 2008.  One could easily make the argument that the Arkansas legislature could have passed 
legislation to overturn the actions of the attorney general and state Supreme Court.  Instead, they chose to let the 
opinions stand.  The results presented here still held up in the fuller model.  In fact, they added more support to 
the hypothesis.   
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falls below one, that value shows a lower likelihood of adoption in the next state-year.  A higher 
value of one shows a greater likelihood of adoption in the next state-year.  The results are 
included below in Table 2.2.  The variable Contribution Limit on Corporation and PACs, which 
counts states with permissive contribution laws as a value of one, shows a much lower 
probability of passing regulation laws against payday lenders.  Stated another way, in the next 
cycle, states that have the most permissive campaign contribution laws are about .61 (1 minus 
the coefficient of .39) times as likely to adopt payday lending regulation as states with strict 
campaign finance laws.  The results are statistically significant at the .01 level.  Payday lenders 
are willing to donate campaign dollars to legislators.   The finding suggests that legislators in 
states with permissive contribution laws may succumb more readily to the enticements and 
desires of payday lenders, even after controlling for other possible explanations.  Campaign 
donations are important to politicians and their political chances.  On an issue where corporate 
desires are clear and policy outcomes are measureable, these campaign contribution laws show 




The event history analysis also reveals that states with unified Democratic government 
are more likely to pass payday lending regulation.  A state with this specific political 
environment is 66% more likely to adopt payday lending regulation in the next cycle.  The 
variable behaves in the expected way and hits statistical significance at the 95% confidence 
level.  With payday lending’s reputation, unified Democratic governments show a willingness to 
Table 2.2:  Payday Lending:  An Event History Analysis 
 CRL and NCSL Rating 
 Hazard Ratio 
Variable  (Standard Error) 
Contribution Limit on Corporation and PACs .39 *** 
 (.08)   
Unified, Democratic Government 1.66 ** 
(.38) 
 




Minority Percentage in State .07 ** 
(.09) 
 
Women Percentage in State Legislature 1.08 *** 
(.02) 
 




South 8.60 *** 
(3.22) 
 
Poverty Level .84 *** 
(.04) 
 
Number of cases 526  
Log-Likelihood -633.34  
Chi-Squared 117.05 *** 
***p .01 (one-tailed test) 
  
**p .05 (one-tailed test) 
  
*p .10 (one-tailed test) 
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regulate the industry in order to protect their constituents from high interest rates and rollover 
fees.   
A state’s business climate, as rated by the Tax Foundation, moves in the unexpected 
direction but fails to reach statistical significance.  The model fails to show sufficient proof that a 
state with beneficial corporate tax laws is also a state willing to allow its payday lending 
businesses to run a little more unimpeded.   
The percentage of women serving in state legislatures influences the likelihood of 
passage of payday lending regulation.  A state with just a one-percent increase in its percentage 
of women legislators is 8% more likely to adopt regulation in the next cycle.  The result is 
statistically significant at the .01 level.  Women provide regulation advocates with allies in state 
legislatures.  They also provide women with representation since, as mentioned above, women 
tend to be overrepresented among payday borrowers.  Women look out for the concerns of the 
poor in ways different than their male counterparts and, as will be shown above, other groups 
within a state’s legislature.        
The variable representing minority percentages in a state’s legislature runs in the 
unexpected direction but fails to hit statistical significance in this model.  Minorities are 
disproportionately targeted by payday lenders and require regulation protections from the debt 
trap.  Perhaps the issue has not risen to a level of salience to activate minority legislators, as 
proposed by the literature (for example, Hutchings 1997).  Perhaps minority legislators are 
unsure how to react to these payday lenders.  While their rates may be high and may unduly 
burden many minority borrowers, these payday lenders are sometimes the only source of lending 
to borrowers.  Removing them could affect their constituents with no other means through which 
to borrow money. This finding and its causes require future evaluation.   
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Rounding out the remaining control variables, poverty runs in the opposite direction and 
hits a high level (.01) of statistical significance.  States with a one-percent increase in their 
poverty level are .16 as likely to adopt in the next state-year.  This variable may function this 
way for the reasons attributed to the minority variable.  While payday lenders lend money at high 
interest rates, they remain one of the only sources of lending for those with bad credit.  Those 
with the worst credit tend to be the poor.  States with high rates of poor may opt not to rid their 
states of this important lender, no matter the consequences.  Perhaps surprisingly, the South 
produces states that are 8.60 times more likely to adopt regulation in the next cycle.  This may 
surprise many since the South may not seem like a region that would push for so much 
regulation.  However, the South is home to the Center for Responsible Lending, one of the 
country’s fiercest advocates for payday regulation.  The South may also be the ideal place for the 
need for regulation due to its poverty levels and high minority concentrations.  In addition, parts 
of the South were still transitioning from Democratic to Republican governments.  More 
progressive Democrats may have led efforts to push for more advocacy of payday lending 
regulation.  In one last surprise, the variable measuring the percentage of neighbors with payday 
regulation fails to produce statistically significant results.  The percentage of neighbors that have 
adopted regulation does not improve chances for adoption.  The variable deserves a closer look 
given its importance to the policy adoption and diffusion literature.  For example, a quick re-test 
of the data using neighbors as a simple tally, not a percentage, yields statistically significant 
results for this variable.  Perhaps the data is skewed by states that only share borders with a few 
states when states are more likely to support regulation after the peer pressure of several 
neighbors.   
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Data and Methods for Strictness Hypothesis 
For secondary consideration, I use the ordered probit model to estimate the likelihood 
campaign contribution laws influence the strictness of regulation within each state.  This model 
is appropriate given the ordinal categorization of payday lending laws created by the Center for 
Responsible Lending and the National Conference of State Legislatures.  The dependent variable 
runs from values of zero to two.  While many policy diffusion and adoption studies utilize event 
history analysis to test their hypotheses, I include this secondary approach because I am 
interested in the information available on the strictness of this regulation.  While an element of 
timing is lost in this approach, the model makes up for it by not discarding the strictness 
information.  My main dependent variables here take on three values, which allows for more 
variation and for a more nuanced view of the policy world.  In almost every policy situation, 
states can choose not to act, can regulate in various ways and degrees, and can outright ban 
certain practices.  I wish to identify states and variables that regulate the strongest under this 
analytical approach.  The strictness hypothesis will be tested through this model, showing which 
variables affect the likelihood of strict regulation by the year 2013. 
 My dependent variable considers the level of regulation imposed within each state.  I 
measure and test influence on the level of regulation in two different ways.  First, the Center for 
Responsible Lending (CRL), long considered an expert on payday lending, produced a report 
(Montezemolo 2013) in which it categorized states into one of three levels:  no meaningful 
regulation, regulation that limits but does not eliminate, and regulation that effectively eliminates 
the payday debt trap.  I use this data to construct my dependent variable, with each state 
receiving a zero, one, or two based on CRL’s categories.  Zero represents states with no 
meaningful regulation, one represents limits but no elimination, and two represents those states 
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that eliminate the debt trap.  CRL places twenty-nine states into the category with no meaningful 
regulation.  The organization recognizes six more with regulation that limits the debt trap and 
places the remaining fifteen states in the category that eliminates the debt trap.   
To examine if campaign contribution laws influence the likelihood of payday lending 
regulation, I analyze each state’s limits on corporate contributions to candidates during the 
period in question.  The National Conference of State Legislatures (2013) and the Federal 
Election Commission (2016) provide these limits in very convenient formats.  In order to 
thoroughly test my hypothesis, I analyze the data to find out the states that do and do not have a 
prohibition of corporate contributions.  Twenty-nine states have no such prohibition of corporate 
donations, leaving twenty-one that do.  These twenty-nine states receive a one; states with the 
prohibition take on a value of zero.  I expect that those states accepting corporate donations will 
have a lower likelihood of regulation.  Table 2.1 shows the states with bans on corporate 
donations.         
 I focus my attention on what payday lending laws look like in 2013.  As stated above, 
payday lending is a recent phenomenon, with much of the storefront growth and legislative 
response taking place in the 2000s.  I create a snapshot of the payday lending regulation laws on 
the books in 2013 and attempt to capture the institutional rules and political climate these laws 
faced leading up to 2013.  That is, I consider the political environment leading up to 2013 
snapshot to see how the environment may have shaped the strictness of regulation.  Almost every 
state remains stable across the variables.  Colorado and Tennessee are the only states that adjust 
their campaign contribution laws during this period.  Colorado, though, makes the switch very 
early in the time period (2002).  It does not pose a complication to the ordered probit model.  
Tennessee creates little more of a concern because it changes its corporate campaign 
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contributions laws in 2011.  Moving from a ban on corporate contributions to allowance of them 
places the state in a different category for the corporate contributions variable.  Still, I include it 
in the model because it spends several years leading up to 2013 in the lenient campaign 
contribution category.4       
I also include the same control variables of the event history analysis here for 
consideration in the ordered probit model.  I take the final percentage of neighbors that enacted 
regulation.  For the unified, Democrat variable, I take an average of all the state-years and assign 
that value to the state.  The state values for this variable range from zero (no unified Democratic 
government ever) to one (all unified Democratic government during this period), with most 
states taking on decimal values between these two limits.   I then take the value of 2013 for 
women legislators, for a state’s percentage of minorities, and poverty level.  Even though I only 
consider the 2013 value, this should not skew the results in this model.  The values for each state 
remain very stable from year to year.   
   
Strictness Hypothesis Results 
Campaign contribution laws play an important role in influencing the likelihood of 
meaningful payday regulation.  Table 2.3 below shows the results for the strictness analysis.  The 
independent variable of interest moves in the expected direction and achieves statistical 
significance.  States that permit these corporate contributions have a lower likelihood of adopting 
strict regulation.5        
 
                                                          
4 I include discussion of Tennessee in a footnote below when discussing the results of the model.   
5 The model is unaffected by dropping Tennessee from consideration.  The main variable of interest still keeps its 




Table 2.3:  Variables That Influence the Odds of Regulation of Payday Lending, Ordered Probit 
 Coefficient 
Variable  (Standard Error) 





State's Percentage of 








Poverty Level .05  
(.09)   
South 1.30 ** 
(.63)   
Minority Percentage in State -.03  
(.02)  
Women Percentage in State 
Legislature 
.11 *** 
(.04)   
Business Climate -.02   
(.24)   
Number of cases 43   
Log-Likelihood -28.34 
 
Chi-Squared 21.83 ** 
Pseudo-R2 0.23 
 
Cut 1 4.26   
(2.23)   




***p .01 (one-tailed test)   
**p .05 (one-tailed test)   
*p .10 (one-tailed test)     
 
I include predicted probabilities for campaign contributions in Table 2.4.  Table 2.4 
shows that states with no prohibition on corporate contributions are 83% likely to produce no 
meaningful regulation of payday lenders.  On the other hand, states with a ban on corporate 
contributions, are 42% more likely to enact some type regulation on payday lenders.  These 
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statistically significant results show that these campaign contribution laws influence the types of 
policies passed within the states.     
 
Table 2.4.  Independent Variable Impacts on Payday Regulation 














Corporate Donations    
     Not Allowed 58 22 20 
     Allowed 83 11 6 
Note:  These estimates represent the predicted probabilities of each category of payday 
regulation given values of independent variables, while holding all other variables at their 
means.   
 
Returning to Table 2.3, having neighbors adopt payday regulation is an important 
variable in the policy diffusion literature and in the story told here.  Table 2.3 confirms that 
neighboring effects are highly significant, with .01 significance levels.  Specifically, as the 
percentage of adjacent neighbors with payday regulation increases, the likelihood of meaningful 
legislation increases with it.  Given the policy adoption and diffusion literature, the finding 
comes as no surprise here.  Neighboring states with payday regulation influence each other, no 
matter what the reason for the influence may be.  The scope of this particular study does not 
allow room to uncover the motives for this neighboring effect, but given the nature of payday 
lending, a study on the mechanisms at work could produce a very interesting discussion.6          
                                                          
6 Here, it is important to note that I also ran the model without the percentage of neighbors with payday 
regulation.  Some might argue that considering the full percentage of neighbors that are payday regulators might 
be unfair because this independent variable might take on its full value after the state already adopted payday 
regulation.  That means that this neighbor adopter variable might not actually be a cause of adoption.  When I 
remove this variable entirely from the model, my independent variable of interest, campaign contributions laws, 
just falls out of statistical significance range (.1 level).  Furthermore, when I drop this variable and the unified, 
Democratic variable from the equation, the independent variable of interest falls further from statistical 
significance.  I opt for the model I use, though, because I am interested in predicted probabilities.  I want a 
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Working through the rest of Table 2.3, the remaining control variables produce a mixed 
bag of results.  States with a greater amount of unified, Democratic government moves in the 
right direction but fails to produce meaningful regulation.  The poverty level of a state sways the 
results in no meaningful way.  While the coefficient is in the expected direction, it fails to meet 
statistical significance in all of the four models.  The South, on the other hand, produces a 
significant likelihood of higher regulation.  Again, the South is home to the Center for 
Responsible Lending, one of the fiercest advocates of payday lending regulation.  Minority 
percentages produce insignificant results, but the results consistently run in a problematic 
direction for advocates of payday regulation.  The final variable, business climate, trends in the 
expected direction but fails to achieve statistically significant results.        
Women percentages in the legislature run in the predicted direction and are statistically 
significant.  That is, higher levels of women in the state legislature lead to a higher likelihood of 
stricter payday regulation within a state.  Women seem to provide a likely ally in the fight for 
regulation.         
 
Conclusion  
The results presented here show just how important campaign contribution laws and 
limits are to policy.  These laws have the ability to sway regulation policy.  In other words, a 
state that allows corporations to give at all or that allows political action committees to give 
generously sets up the likelihood that these groups can influence their way to the policy they 
desire.  At the very least, they can water down a policy in their favor.  Payday lending is an 
                                                          
snapshot view of payday regulation in 2013 so that I can test the strictness of regulation.  The model is imperfect 
but captures the variables I expect would have an influence on payday regulation by 2013, not exactly in 2013.  I 
would expect that the percentage of neighbors with payday lending would influence each other, especially when 
the percentage of neighbors is rather large by 2013.            
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important example of this danger because payday lenders 1) are willing givers of campaign funds 
and 2) have a very clear-cut purpose in terms of regulation.  If these payday lenders give 
generously and legislators gladly accept, a tacit agreement takes place.  While the current 
literature finds no clear connection between roll-call votes and campaign contributions, other 
studies show that there are many other ways in which legislators can engage and intervene on a 
contributor’s behalf.  There are so many intervention points within the policy process, and by 
even setting the agenda from the outset, these intervention points may be unnecessary.  By 
looking at the contribution laws first and identifying the ensuing policy from those laws, this 
study uncovers a relationship and a potential connection between the two.  There are two logical 
next steps that follow from this study.  First, the policy literature deserves even more studies of 
the impact of these contribution laws on policy.  Where corporate desires are clear and political 
actions are easy to tease out, studies will likely find that these laws influence political decision-
making.  There are many other policy areas where industry does not regulation and fights with its 
pocketbooks to protect its interest.  These policy areas deserve attention to further test the 
findings of this study.   
Second, this study identifies the potential danger between donations and regulation but 
does not identify the various ways in which legislators intervene on a donor’s behalf.  How 
exactly do legislators intervene on a donor’s behalf?  Are they involved in keeping a policy area 
entirely off the legislative agenda?  These areas might be more difficult to measure than a roll-
call vote, but they are necessary to uncovering the relationship between contributions and 
legislative influence.       
In a broader sense, while the story told here lends itself well to payday lending, it also 
shows that campaign contribution laws belong in other policy adoption and diffusion stories.  
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Payday lenders are not the only ones who give generously to legislatures.  Political science 
spends much time thinking about what campaign contributions actually gain for the donor.  By 
focusing on the laws first, then scholars and practitioners can understand what is truly at stake 
for each policy area within a state given the institutional rules surrounding campaign 
contributions.  This study introduces the concept to the literature on policy adoption, and the 
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Minority Population, Professionalism, and the Percentage of 
Minority Legislators in the States 
 
Introduction 
While Latinos and Blacks together make up over twenty-five percent of America’s 
population, they occupy only twelve percent of the state legislative seats available throughout the 
country’s state capitol buildings.  A concentration of minorities in the same states and districts 
certainly matters to the electoral chances of minorities (see Squire 1992; Gerber, Morton, and 
Rietz 1998; Casellas 2009).  Just like political parties in American politics, election of a member 
of any group requires enough like-minded supporters.  Minorities often draw support from other 
minorities.  While a concentration of like individuals is an important determinant of descriptive 
representation, surely other factors within a state influence the underrepresentation of minorities.  
States vary in the type of institutional rules they put in place, for example.  Aside from electoral 
rules or district demographics, the nature of the position and the organization these candidates 
desire to join may bar or encourage them to pursue elected office.  This is true for everyday 
Americans as they pursue job opportunities.  The same is likely true for those seeking a job 
opportunity in the seats of legislative chambers across the country.  This article analyzes all 
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legislative chambers within the American states and focuses on the different population and 
institutional characteristics among the states that might influence the amount of minorities 
elected to state legislatures. 
Of course, one question must be asked before launching into an analysis:  Why is having 
minority legislators important to the minority populations within the states?  The literature in this 
area stems from Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) definitions of descriptive and substantive representation.  
The two types of representation are different but often connected in the case of minority 
representation, with descriptive representation often leading to substantive representation 
because minority legislators often understand the plight of minority families best.  While 
descriptive representation does not always lead to substantive representation (Swain 1993), at 
least by the way substantive representation might be measured, most scholars have, in fact, found 
that minority legislators support more specific policies and actions important to minority 
populations than white legislators (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Hall 1996; Whitby 1997; 
Hutchings 1998; Canon 1999; Tate 2003; Minta 2009).  Minority populations have policy 
interests important to them, and minority legislators may more acutely understand what those 
interests are.  According to the literature, these minority legislators then act on this understanding 
in ways different from their peers.       
If minority legislators matter to minority interests, then getting minority candidates 
elected serves as an important pre-condition.  States, though, vary in their institutional rules and 
characteristics, population demographics, and minority concentrations.  These all may serve as 
barriers to entry.  Minorities face separate challenges and opportunities from state to state.  
Casellas (2009), for example, explores a state’s Latino percentage and its institutional features 
and finds that states with larger Latino percentages tend to elect more Latino legislators.  He also 
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finds some support for institutional features that might foster the election of Latinos as political 
newcomers.  Casellas’s study serves as an important step in the literature toward consideration of 
institutional factors on minority representation.  As professionalism increases, he argues, the 
percentage of Latinos in a state’s legislature should decrease.  He believes that Latinos cannot 
compete with the resources and the networks established by more seasoned political groups.  He 
argues that Latinos stand better odds in citizen legislatures.  I also believe that professionalism is 
important to the minority representation story and that it deserves further consideration.  I argue 
that professionalism influences a candidates’ decision to even run and, ultimately, to win a seat 
in the legislature. However, I argue that minorities’ opportunities at legislative seats are better 
served by more professional legislatures.  I argue in the opposite direction of Casellas.  I argue 
that Latinos often come from Latino-heavy districts, where their chances of winning election are 
great.  If chances of winning are great, then the final motivation for these legislators comes from 
the benefits of a more professional legislature.  Specifically, as a state legislature’s 
professionalism increases, I hypothesize that the increase in professionalism will also increase 
the percentage of minority legislators within a state’s legislature.  This argument falls closer in 
line with Fiorina’s (1994) argument on Democrats and professionalism and Squire’s (1992) 
argument on Black legislators and professionalism.  I add to those discussions, though, by 
considering the impact of minority concentrations within districts.   
The article indeed confirms the literature in regard to a state’s percentage of minorities—
the percentages of minorities within a state drive the percentage of seats held by minorities 
higher within state legislative chambers.  The states with the highest minority percentages 
continue to have the single largest impact on the number of minorities in the legislature.  In 
addition, this article also confirms that professionalism works in the hypothesized direction, with 
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higher levels of professionalism influencing the percentage of seats occupied by minorities.  
Several control variables also paint an interesting picture of minority representation.  The 
measure of support for a party matters to Latinos’ chances of securing a seat, with minorities 
standing a better chance of higher legislative percentages in Democrat-leaning states.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, states with larger urban percentages produce lesser levels of Latinos in state 
legislatures but have little impact on the percentage of Black legislators.  To begin the paper’s 
discussion, I first lay out the theory and hypotheses. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
States vary in the institutional rules that govern them. For example, states vary in the 
amount of legislative pay, the amount of staff afforded to each legislative member, the frequency 
and length of a state’s legislative sessions, per diem benefits afforded to legislative members, etc.  
All these different institutional features undoubtedly weigh into a politician’s choice to run, 
ability to win, and even a politician’s mode of operation once there.  Below, I explore the current 
literature surrounding these claims. 
Many studies consider the role of professionalism in influencing the political process.  
For example, some consider the impact of professionalism on divided government, 
responsiveness, and policy decisions (Squire 1998, 2002; Huber, Shipan, and Pfaler 2001; Huber 
and Shipan 2002; Maestas 2003; Shipan and Volden 2008; McCann, Shipan, and Volden 2015).  
Professionalism certainly shapes the way states respond to political decisions once in office.     
The amount of time spent in session and the amount of staff certainly affect response rates and 
policy options.  However, very few studies consider the impact of those that might seek and win 
seats based on professionalism.     
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Enter Fiorina (1994).  Fiorina hypothesizes that more professional legislatures influence 
the election of more Democratic representation.  He argues that Democratic candidates tend to be 
salary and wage employees, and they will enter the political fray only when the benefits (like 
salary) become more enticing than their previous job. On the reverse side, he argues that 
Republicans, who tend to be in more flexible, lucrative careers, will prefer part-time legislative 
work because it allows for these Republicans to keep their higher-paying jobs.  These part-time 
positions often allow their officeholder to do both jobs, full-time job and part-time legislator, at 
the same time.  He indeed finds support for his hypotheses and finds further support in a later 
work (Fiorina 1999).  Fiorina begins the path toward identifying who might be encouraged to run 
and win election by the professionalism of a legislature.  By extension, the level of 
professionalism may influence other groups that are not too financially wealthy and flexible.  A 
well-paid position in a professional legislature may offer better salary, benefits, prestige, and 
work environment.  This type of position potentially opens the door for many more candidates.        
Another study furthers the cause by identifying the power of professionalism in shaping 
minorities’ choices about whether to run.  Like many Democratic candidates, minorities tend to 
not have the same resources as other politically powerful groups, but Casellas (2009) theorizes in 
a different direction than Fiorina.  Casellas hypothesizes that state legislatures with higher levels 
of professionalism will have lower levels of Latinos.  His study focuses on professionalism’s 
influence on minority representation, the chief focus of this paper.  He argues the following: 
Because citizen legislatures are less financially desirable, the pool of candidates for them 
should be smaller, which should benefit political newcomers.  Latinos are political 
newcomers, so states with citizen legislatures should be more likely to be associated with 
greater levels of Latino representation, because turnover is higher and competition is less 
fierce for these seats giving disadvantaged groups more and better opportunities to win. 




Casellas uses the concept of “political newcomers” to show that Latinos are unable to 
compete for the more lucrative seats in a more professional legislature.  Casellas finds no support 
for his professionalism hypothesis on its own.  However, he finds that an interaction between 
professionalism and percentage of Latinos within a state influence the descriptive representation 
of Latinos within a state’s legislature.  Casellas’s hypothesis deserves a more careful 
examination.  This careful examination should consider the reasons why Fiorina’s claim and 
Casellas’s claim run in different directions and how they might be reconciled.   
I find a number of shortcomings with Casellas’s approach.  First, his model shows that 
the most important influence on Latinos’ percentage of legislator seats is the percentage of 
Latino residents within a state.  Its influence on the dependent variable is overwhelming, and any 
interaction with this variable may confound the results.  Indeed, the only way professionalism 
becomes significant in any way is by interacting with the Latino percentage variable.  
Professionalism on its own remains statistically insignificant throughout the various models he 
runs.     
Second, Casellas’s definition of “political newcomer” may not paint the correct relative 
picture.  Across the state, Latinos may be one of the most inexperienced groups.  However, what 
really matters is a comparison of candidates within districts.  Casellas fails to correctly consider 
the residential patterns and voting jurisdictions of minorities.  The implication of his theory is 
that Latinos are dispersed across the state when minority groups often live and vote together.  
While Casellas builds his professionalism hypothesis on the idea of Latinos as political 
newcomers with no established networks, again, he fails to acknowledge that minority groups 
build up networks of their own by living near one another.  If his assumption about dispersion 
were true, then his hypothesis might prove true.  Minorities would not have political resources to 
49 
 
build an effective campaign.  Instead, minorities live together and often have large enough voting 
blocs to vote in one of their own.  In these homogeneous districts, candidates look more similar 
to each other because they belong to the same community.  In other words, their political 
pocketbooks match each other better than Casellas’s assumption suggests.   
With race not as much a factor in homogeneous minority districts, minorities may 
consider other factors in their decision to run, such as the level of professionalism of the state 
legislature.   For example, Claudine Gay (2001) cites the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a “potent 
tool” in carving out representation opportunities for minority candidates (p. 7).  This means that 
the number of minorities within a voting jurisdiction may influence a candidate to seek office.  
Their opportunities to win office increase in these majority-minority districts.  Minority voters 
tend to support candidates from within their own ranks, and if they are also living together, 
minority candidates may have a better chance at winning than Casellas’s hypothesis suggests.  
The level of professionalism of a state legislature then entices only the best minority candidates 
to pursue office, much like the scenario painted by Fiorina.  The level of professionalism offers a 
just reward to the victor in the form of salary, increased staffing, and other benefits.  Within 
these communities, minorities also have pillars of their community, people who rise to 
prominence within these communities.  They may be swayed by the salaries and benefits of a 
legislative position.  They likely face other minorities in legislative races instead of white 
candidates.  Minorities’ chances to win are much greater in this reality than in Casellas’s 
scenario.    
Third, I turn attention from solely Latino or Black percentages within a state to an 
analysis of the two percentages as a measure of minority population.  Casellas focuses on only 
Latinos, and an earlier study by Squire (1992) focuses on solely Black percentages.  Squire finds 
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that more professional legislatures drive up the percentage of Black legislatures.  Both paint an 
incomplete picture because Blacks and Latinos often face the same challenges.  They both lack 
political resources in comparison to other groups, but they often live in homogeneous districts.  
While some states may lean heavier in one direction or the other, many states see large 
concentrations of one or both minority groups.  Where this occurs, they often live concentrated 
in cities, gathering up high enough percentages to elect one of their own.  Blacks and Latinos, 
with less resources than other political groups, would be motivated by more professional 
legislatures in the same way.   
Finally, with many minorities voting and running as Democrats, by extension, Fiorina’s 
theory seems much likelier at play in the percentage of minorities elected to state legislatures.  
For “political newcomers,” but even more for those not wealthy, the higher level of 
professionalism potentially drives minorities to seek and win legislative seats.  Citizen 
legislatures will not appeal to those that do not have the flexibility to leave their primary places 
of employment.  These citizen legislators, for the most part, must have the means to do so.  
Minorities, with a lack of resources relative to other groups, must be enticed by the thought of 
higher pay and better benefits.  As “political newcomers,” they will also be moved by a bigger, 
more experienced staff they gain in more professional legislatures.  Because they may be newer 
to the legislative game, having this more professional staff means that they can still accomplish 
much politically and not be at a complete disadvantage.  All these layers of professionalism will 
appeal to outstanding minority candidates, and they will fight harder to win seats in a more 
professional legislature.  With the proper incentives set up and the residential and electoral 
system reconsidered, I veer from Casellas, move more in line with Fiorina and Squire, and set up 




Professionalism Hypothesis:  Higher levels of professionalism will be associated with 
higher percentages of minority legislators within a state’s legislative chambers.        
 
In addition, the discussion above has implications for geographic location.  In Squire’s 
(1992) groundbreaking paper, he finds support for professionalism driving up Black legislator 
percentages and then speculates other reasons for higher Black percentages:  Concentration of 
Black voters in the same districts and legislation designed to increase descriptive representation.    
His model, though, only accounts for states within the South and does not account for these 
features from state to state.  The discussion I conduct above also signals the importance of 
geographic location and legislative intervention.  Neither Squire nor Casellas considers the 
impact the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has on minority representation.  Its impact on minority 
legislator percentages could still go either way.  I tend to agree with both Gay and Squire that the 
Voting Rights Act increased the descriptive representation of minority voters over the last 
several decades.  Federal preclearance of states’ electoral processes likely prevented a majority 
of the dilution some states would have preferred.  If not for the Voting Rights Act, these states’ 
percentages would be much lower.  However, I do not believe that they were able to fully make 
up for states’ attempts to dilute minorities’ voices in the states.  I believe that those states still 
subject to the Act remain so for a reason.  If these states stopped violating the Act, they could 
have been removed from the preclearance requirement.  Instead, through the 2000s, these states 
remain subject to preclearance under Section 5 of the Act because they continually dilute the 
descriptive representation of minorities.  These states will still fall below the expectation of 
where their current minority legislator percentages should be given their minority state 
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percentages, and I expect these VRA-subjected states to negatively influence the percentage of 
minority legislators in these states.    This belief leads to the next hypothesis:   
 
Voting Rights Act Hypothesis:  States subject to the Voting Rights Act will be associated 
with a lower percentage of minority state legislators.   
 
Finally, I consider the urban percentage of a state’s population.  Once again, Squire and 
Casellas both fail to account for the urban percentage within each state.  A concentration of 
minority voters within certainly leads to a higher probability of a minority legislator.  The Voting 
Rights Act, for its part, ensures that the percentage itself works in a linear format.  However, 
when considering the concentration of voters within a state, minorities tend to live 
disproportionately in urban areas.  Of course, in order to elect more minorities within a state, a 
balance must be struck between dispersion and concentration in order to have more chances at 
representation.  Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran (1996), for example, find a trade-off between 
concentration and dispersion.  They argue that minorities in non-Southern states receive 
representation when minority voters are distributed evenly across a number of legislative 
districts, but in the South, they estimate that minority voters are better off in concentrated 
districts.  In addition, while some studies argue that the concentration of minority voters is 
important to their electoral chances and descriptive and substantive representation (Davidson 
1984; Grofman and Davidson 1992; Cain 1992; Davidson 1992; Kousser 1993), others find that 
too much concentration of minority voters dilutes the chances of more minority legislators 
(Brace, Grofman, and Handley 1987; Hill 1995; McDonald 1992).  The literature suggests a 
curvilinear relationship, one where a critical mass of minority voters is needed, but too much 
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concentration results in diminishing returns as the concentration rises past a certain point.  Still, I 
believe that a higher concentration of minorities within the same area leads to greater chances of 
minorities not being ignored.  Any test of this would need to be controlled for the curvilinear 
relationship, which I discuss later in the paper.  I hypothesize in the following way:   
 
Urban Concentration and Its Interaction Hypothesis:  The higher the percentage of 
urban population within a state, the higher the percentage of minority legislators.  Its 
influence becomes even more pronounced when it interacts with a state’s minority 
percentage.  When these two variables go up together, minority legislator percentage 
goes higher.     
 
These three hypotheses more accurately theorize the institutional and geographical 
challenges minority legislators face in the likelihood of receiving higher percentages in state 
legislatures.  The next section explores the data and methods used to appropriately test these 
three different hypotheses.   
 
Data and Methods 
I test the hypotheses by considering legislator and state data surrounding 2009 levels of 
minority representation in state legislatures.  I test upper and lower chambers separately.  Due to 
the fewer seats available in most upper chambers, selectivity for these seats may impact the 
variables differently.  I also create separate models for Blacks and Latino legislative percentages.  
In states where high concentrations of minorities exist, states vary greatly in their percentages of 
each group.  Some are lopsided toward one minority group, and other states have large 
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concentrations of both minority groups.  I separate the two to get an idea of the differences 
between the two largest minority groups.   
I create the dependent variable by using information that comes from the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (2009).  The organization measured the number and percentage 
of Black and Latino legislators within state legislative chambers during 2009.  I only examine the 
percentages of Black and Latino legislators in each state chamber and do not include other 
minority groups in this variable and throughout the rest of the model.  I choose 2009 because it is 
late in the decade after all or most Voting Rights Act reviews should be complete.  Since 
Nebraska is a unicameral legislature, I include its statistics under the upper chamber.  This data 
then produces a total of forty-nine cases for the lower chamber models and fifty cases for the 
upper chamber models of the states’ legislatures. 
The first main explanatory variable homes in on the professionalism of each state’s 
legislature.  I use Squire’s (2007) professionalism index to estimate professionalism’s influence 
on minority legislator percentages.  Squire measures professionalism around the year 2003 by 
taking into account legislator pay, length of time in legislative session each year, and the number 
of staff members at the disposal of legislators.  He uses Congress as the baseline and compares 
all state legislatures to the national branch.  This comparison yields a score below one for each 
state.  The values range from a low .027 for New Hampshire to a high professionalism score of 
.626 for California, with a median of .148 (Delaware and Kentucky).  The median sits much 
closer to New Hampshire than California, suggesting that most states have a low level of 
professionalism or, in other words, a dependence on citizen legislatures.  Squire notes that while 
the levels of professionalism remains fairly stable, changes within Congress and the state 
legislatures cause the professionalism measure to move.  For this reason, even if Squire found 
55 
 
positive results for professionalism and the level of Black legislators within a state, the subject 
requires another look, this time for the levels of all minority legislators.  Again, I expect that the 
percentage of minority legislators in a state chamber will increase as the level of professionalism 
increases within the state.      
The second explanatory variable involves states subject to preclearance under the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.  I use the United States Department of Justice’s (2016) list to construct this 
variable. During the 2000s, thirteen states still fell entirely within the preclearance or have 
significant portions (four counties or more) subject to review.  These thirteen states include 
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.  I expect that these states subject to 
preclearance will still produce lower levels of minority representation.  For this reason, these 
states still fell under the jurisdiction of the United States Department of Justice.  They 
continually violated the Voting Rights Act by marginalizing the votes of minority constituents.  
Most of the violators are in the South, making a variable for Southern states superfluous and 
even problematic due to collinearity.              
The remaining explanatory variables test the hypotheses on geographic concentration.  I 
use the United States 2000 Census (2016) to measure the percentage of a state’s urban 
population.  The Census defines the urban percentage within a state by those Americans living in 
areas with 2,500 people or more.  This loose definition of urban population means that 79% of 
America lives in an area classified as urban.  The percentages range from a low of 38.66% for 
Maine to a high of 94.95% for California.  I expect that the higher percentages will be associated 
with an increase in the percentage of minority legislators within a state.   
56 
 
In addition, I include an interaction between the urban variable and the percentage of a 
state’s minority population.  Given the earlier discussion about a possible curvilinear relationship 
between minority concentration and its effects on minority legislators’ election, I utilize the log 
of a minority population before I interact it with the urban variable.  I expect that the percentage 
of minority legislators will increase as the interaction between the urban and minority population 
variables increase.   
I include several important control variables in the analysis.  I use data from the 2000 
United States Census to measure the percentage of each state’s minority population.  The Census 
measures Black and Latino populations separately, so I simply take each percentage and divide 
by the state’s total population. Squire (1992) and Casellas (2009) find overwhelming support for 
a state’s Black and Latino percentage, respectively, to influence the percentage of Latino 
legislators.  In their models, this variable produced the most significant influence on the 
percentage of Black and Latino legislators, respectively.  I expect the same amount of support for 
a state’s overall minority percentage, with higher levels of minority population associated with 
an increase in the level of minority legislators. 
I use a few other state characteristics to serve as control variables.  I measure the 
partisanship influence on the percentage of a state’s minority legislators.  For example, I measure 
a state’s political to see if it impacts the number of minorities the state is willing to elect to 
legislative seats.  I consider the amount of partisanship within each state government during the 
2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections by reviewing data from the Federal Election 
Commission’s presidential election reports (2016).  I calculate the percentage support for the 
Republican candidate in each election (Bush, Bush, and McCain, respectively) and then divide it 
by the total number of voters in the state.  I then add up the percentages from the three years in 
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question and divide by three to get an average level of support for the Republic candidate.  The 
idea here is that Democrats will provide more opportunities for minorities to be elected that 
decade.  Casellas (2009) indeed finds support for ideology in the election of Latino legislators 
while Squire (1992) does not find the same support for Black legislators.  I expect to find that 
higher levels of Republican support will be associated with lower percentages of minority 
legislators within a state. 
In addition, Casellas (2009) finds mixed support for term limits.  He argues that term 
limits’ higher turnover would give political newcomers more of a chance to enter the political 
fray.  Unfortunately, the higher turnover could cut the other way and eliminate minority 
legislators just as easily.  I include them for analysis anyway.  The variable serves as a dummy 
variable, with states with term limits taking on a value of one.  While I do not expect to find any 
results for this variable , I include the variable in the analysis so that I can make a more direct 
comparison to Casellas’s model.   
I use multivariate regression to estimate the influence of my independent variables on the 
percentage of minority legislators within each state’s legislative chamber.  The model measures 
the influence of the hypotheses involving professionalism, the Voting Rights Act, and the urban 
percentage of a state.         
 
Results and Discussion 
Unfortunately, the models run into an insurmountable problem from the beginning.  One 
of the variables creates issues with multicollinearity in all the models.  During tests, the 
interaction between the urban variable and the Latino state percentage variable renders results in 
all the models uninterpretable.  Appendix 3.1 shows just one model and the problems created by 
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the variable’s inclusion.  The coefficient for the interaction, -293.12, is large and extremely 
suspicious.  Likewise, it throws the Latino state percentage variable out of order.  A stepwise 
regression test showed that the Latino state percentage variable belongs in the .85 range for the 
Latino models, not -12.85.  Further tests show why the variable creates such problems.  The 
correlation between the interaction and the Latino state percentage variable are nearly perfectly 
correlated.  I tested the interaction variable using strictly percentages of each variable.  It did not 
work.  I then took the log of each term before interacting them.  Nothing ridded the model of 
multicollinearity issues.  I drop the interaction from the models entirely in order to test the other 
hypotheses.  Table 3.1 shows the resulting coefficients within the Latino models.   
Table 3.1.  Regression Estimates of Independent Variables on Percentage of Latinos Serving in State Legislatures 
 
Lower Chamber Models Upper Chamber Models 
With New Mexico Without New Mexico With New Mexico Without New Mexico 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Variable  (Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error) 
Professionalism .34  5.21 ** 6.40 ** 8.56 ** 
(4.01)  (2.36)  (3.48)  (3.69)  
Urban Percentage 
 
-.17 *** -.07 *** -.19 *** -.10 *** 
(.07)  (.02)  (.05)  (.03)  
Latino State Percentage .85 *** .56 *** .81 *** .59 *** 
(.16)  (.06)  (.12)  (.07)  
Voting Rights Act State 
 
-1.20  .37  .24  1.29 ** 
(1.14)  (.52)  (1.00)  (.76)  
Term Limits of State -.94  -.18  .18  .90  




-.10 ** -.03 * -.11 ** -.06 * 
(.05)  (.02)  (.06)  (.04)  
Constant 12.62 ** 2.83 ** 12.65 ** 4.57 ** 
 (6.44)  (1.48)  (5.40)  (2.55)  
Number of cases 49  48  49  48  
        
F 41.45 *** 45.67 *** 49.73 *** 25.43 *** 
R-squared .87  .90  .87  .84  
***p .01 (one-tailed test),  
**p .05 (one-tailed test) 




Table 3.1 shows four different Latino models.  Two of the models pertain to the lower 
chamber, and two of the models pertain to the upper chamber.  I examine the results from each of 
the models by variable.   
The first variable is professionalism.  Column 1 shows the full model of the lower 
chamber, with all states included.  In this model, professionalism moves in the expected direction 
but fails to reach statistical significance.  A careful study of the data shows exactly why the 
model may create problems for professionalism.  Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 show that New 
Mexico is a clear outlier in so many respects, but the outlier’s effects on the model are most 
pronounced on professionalism.  New Mexico’s Latino legislator percentage comes closest to 
mirroring the percentage size of its actual population.  No other state comes even close.  The 
parity between the two percentages, though, throws New Mexico far outside the linear 
relationship.  Chart 1 shows exactly why the professionalism variable does not achieve 
significance even though the rest of the states appear to behave linearly.  I drop New Mexico 































Figure 3.2.  Plot of Latino State Percentage and 



























Percentage of State Urban Population
Figure 3.3.  Plot of Urban Population and 






















































Figure 3.1.  Plot of Professionalism and 
Percentage of Lower Chamber Seats, 2009
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Sure enough, column 2 of Table 3.1 shows that professionalism drives up the lower 
chamber’s percentage of Latino legislators.  A one-point increase in a state’s professionalism 
score is associated with a 5.21% increase in the percentage of a state’s Latino legislators.  The 
result is statistically significant at the .05 level.  Columns three and four actually show that with 
or without New Mexico, the professionalism variable influence the state’s Latino legislator 
percentage.  In the upper chamber models with and without New Mexico, a one-unit increase in 
professionalism is associated with a 6.40% and 8.56% increase in the Latino state legislator 
percentage.  These two results are statistically significant at the .05 level.  Casellas’s models may 
fail to find this significant, positive relationship because he fails to account for the anomaly that 
is New Mexico.  Its presence in the models certainly affects the lower chamber in a way that 




The third hypothesis does not behave as predicted.  As the urban percentage of a state 
increases, the percentage of Latino legislators in state legislative chambers decreases.  All the 
Latino models show this negative relationship.  A one-unit increase in urban percentage is 
associated with a .07-.19% decrease in the percentage of Latino legislators.  The results are 
statistically significant at the .01 level.  On its face, a logical explanation may exist.  If all 
minority voters are clustered into the same area, their high concentration would produce 
guaranteed spots for minority legislators but fewer overall minority legislators. This supports the 
claims made by previous scholars of majority-minoriy legislative districts (Brace, Grofman, and 
Handley 1987; Hill 1995; McDonald 1992). Of course, the way the Census measures urban 
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population may call into question the results here, too.  The Census includes in its definition of 
urban any person residing in an area with 2,500 people or more.  This definition may not be the 
best measure of population concentration within a state.  Under this definition, many states enjoy 
very high urban percentages, even if they may not have the large cities traditionally considered 
as urban areas.  Furthermore, the literature deserves careful attention paid to the interaction 
between urban percentage and minority percentage within a state. Multicollinearity caused great 
problems with the models constructed here, but the variable is clearly important to the study of 
minority legislator percentages. A perusal of the literature for other urban measurements yields 
zero results.    
Indeed, minority state percentages play the largest role in the percentages of minority 
legislators. Table 3.1 shows the statistically significant results across the four models.  These 
results mirror Squire’s (1992) and Casellas’s (2009) own findings that more Black and Latino 
states produce more Black and Latino legislators, respectively.  This variable reaches statistical 
significance at the .01 level. A one-percent increase in a state’s Latino percentage is associated 
with a .85 and .81 percentage-point increase in the minority percentage of a lower and upper 
chambers of state legislatures, respectively.  Even the models that drop New Mexico still show 
dramatic influence on the Latino legislator percentage.  The influence of the variable is of the 
greatest magnitude out of all the variables tested here.  This is not surprising to political science, 
which sees this as an important prerequisite.  More minorities within a state provide more 
opportunities for one of their own to be elected to office. 
The Voting Rights Act provides a mixed bag of results.  While I hypothesize that the 
variable causes the Latino legislator percentage to move in the negative direction, it only moves 
in the negative direction in one of four models.  Three of the four models produce statistically 
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insignificant results.  Only one model hits statistical significance.  In the upper chamber model 
without New Mexico, Voting Rights Act states shift the line up by 1.29 percentage points.    The 
result is statistically significant at the 95% level.  The Voting Rights Act served as an important 
check on states interested in minority vote suppression.  The positive result bodes well for the 
effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act.  However, results in most of these models here do not 
conclusively write off the pessimistic hypothesis I proposed here.  The variable deserves even 
more attention in the literature.  However, Shelby County v. Holder (2013) ruled that these states 
no longer need to seek preclearance for their voting changes.  The results here show the potential 
need for continued protection of minority votes.    
     
The remaining state characteristics serve as control variables.  As expected, term limits 
produce no conclusive results for the percentage of Latino legislatures.  The models run in 
different directions and fail to produce statistically significant results.  Casellas’s (2009) 
assertations about term limits fail to show up in these models. 
Finally, partisanship during the 2000s influences the percentages of Latino legislators 
elected to state legislatures.  As a state’s Republican vote percentage goes up, the percentage of 
Latino legislators decreases, running in the predicted direction.  A one-percent increase in the 
Republican vote percentage is associated with a .03-.11 percent decrease in the amount of Latino 
legislators.  The partisanship results in all four models are statistically significant at the .1 or .05 






Black Results        
A careful review of the data reveals no significant outliers, unlike the case of New 
Mexico in the Latino models.  Thus, Table 3.2 includes only two models, one for lower 
chambers and one for upper chambers.   
 
Table 3.2.  Regression Estimates of Independent Variables on Percentage of Black Legislators 
Serving in State Legislatures 
 Lower Chamber Model Upper Chamber Model 
 Coefficient Coefficient 
Variable  (Standard Error) (Standard Error) 
Professionalism 7.26 * 5.59  
(4.84)  (6.18)  
Urban Percentage .005  .04  
(.03)  (.04)  
Black State Percentage 
 
.82 *** .63 *** 
(.05)  (.07)  
Voting Rights Act State 
 
-.47  2.10 * 
(1.24)  (1.57)  
Term Limits of State .04  1.12  
(.96)  (1.20)  
Statewide Republican Support 
 
.04  -.02  
(.06)  (.08)  
Constant -4.05  -2.50  
 (4.40)  (5.54)  
Number of cases 
 
49  50  
    
F 60.54  27.19  
R-squared .88  .79  
***p .01 (one-tailed test) 
**p .05 (one-tailed test) 







Table 3.2 shows that professionalism moves in the expected direction and shows some 
statistical significance.  In the lower chamber model, a one-point increase in a state’s 
professionalism score is associated with a 7.26% increase in the percentage of a state’s Black 
legislators.  The result is statistically significant at the .1 level.  In the upper chamber model, on 
the other hand, the results run in the positive direction but show no statistical significance.  This 
revisit and revision to Squire’s model is timely for many reasons.  First, Squire (2007) notes that 
the scores and rankings move from year to year depending on the institutional changes.  These 
movements could mean changes for previous findings based on these professionalism scores.  
Some states expanded their professionalism while others decreased their levels.  His previous 
findings on Black legislative percentages no longer draw as heavily on professionalism 
according to the results presented here.  Second, large numbers of Black residents live in 
Southern states, where professionalism levels are low.  This certainly confounds the results for 
professionalism presented here but also creates an interesting questions:  Could the level of 
professionalism in these Southern states be one of the ways that the South suppresses voters?  
The Voting Rights Act often looks at election laws as ways to suppress voter turnout, but the 
problem may also sit with those that tend to run in citizen legislatures.  This question deserves 
careful attention.             
The urban percentage of a state behaves in the expected direction but does not achieve 
statistical significance in either model.  Unlike the urban variable in the Latino models, this one 
runs in the positive direction.  This one requires very careful attention.  Southern states, where 
many Black residents reside, live in the more rural South.  Future study needs to tease out the 
complexities between minority state percentage, the urban percentage of a state, and American 
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regional differences.  Again, multicollinearity created great difficulties in examining this 
relationship within the models presented here.     
Even here, Black state percentages serve as the most important indicator of Black 
legislator percentages within state legislators.  Table 3.2 shows the results for the lower and 
upper chambers.  A one-percent increase in a state’s Black percentage is associated with a .82 
and .62 percentage-point increase in the minority percentage of the lower and upper chambers of 
state legislatures, respectively.  The results are statistically significant at the .01 level.  What is 
interesting in these results is that there is a big difference between the coefficients for the two 
models.  These differences are not present between the lower and upper chambers in the Latino 
models.  Are there more dramatic institutional differences between chambers in states where 
more of America’s Black population resides?  These results and question provide yet another 
area for future study.   
The Voting Rights Act provides another mixed bag of results.  In the upper chamber 
model, Voting Rights Act states create a shift the regression line by 2.10 percentage points in the 
Black legislator percentage.    The result is statistically significant at the 90% level.  The results 
here and one of the Latino models suggest that the Voting Rights Act has been more effective in 
providing opportunities to minorities in the upper chambers of state legislatures.  Perhaps states 
find voter suppression when fewer seats are at stake much more difficult.  A spotlight shines 
brighter when there are fewer seats to investigate.     
The remaining state characteristics produce no conclusive results.  Term limits run in the 
positive direction but produce no significant results for Black legislator percentages.  Finally, the 
partisanship variable runs in opposite directions with no meaningful results.  While partisanship 
influence legislative outcomes for Latinos, this should perhaps come as no surprise for Black 
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state percentages.  Again, Southern states have high percentages of Blacks, but their states tend 
to vote Republican.  This complicates the partisanship story presented here.   
 
Conclusion 
 Professionalism matters to the interests of Latino voters, candidates, and legislators.  
Professionalism provides the incentive for Latinos to run and win election to the state legislature.  
Even though they may not have the resources to run, they may not need them.  Instead, they run 
in districts where support comes from other Latinos.  Even when they need the resources, 
though, a better job and income may provide the incentive for minorities to find the resources to 
mount effective campaigns.  What complicates the story here, though, is that only weak support 
exists for professionalism driving Black legislator percentages.  I expected the same level of 
support across the two minority groups.  Taking a look at the differences between where Latinos 
and Blacks live, the level of professionalism varies greatly in the states where each group tends 
to congregate.  Southern states are overwhelmingly represented on the low-professionalism side 
of the median.  These states are home to large percentages of Black Americans.  Latinos, on the 
other hand, overwhelmingly live in states on the high-professionalism side of the median.  
California, New York, Texas, and Florida all sit on the high side of professionalism and are 
home to large numbers of Latinos.  The real exception is New Mexico.  The story presented here 
pushes the theory on professionalism ahead but shows that further study is necessary to gain a 
deeper understanding.            
 Interestingly, Carnes and Hansen (2016) recently produced an article undertaking an 
issue related to the study undertaken here.  They use state-level data to examine if higher salaries 
in state legislatures produce economic diversity among state legislatures.  They argue that higher 
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salaries are also more attractive to affluent professionals, which increases competition for 
legislative seats.  They find that higher pay is either the same or worse for representatives 
coming from the working class.  This is not surprising and in no way undercuts the findings 
presented here.  Carnes and Hansen consider working class to come from “manual labor jobs 
(like factory worker), service-industry positions (like restaurant server), clerical jobs (like 
receptionist), or union jobs (like field organizer)” (p. 702).  In most state legislatures, I would 
expect the education level to be high regardless of race.  I would imagine that many of those that 
win (again, regardless of race) do so because they have the qualifications that constituencies 
desire.  I even argued that every community has pillars within its community, and these pillars 
often become so through education, their profession, or their resources.  Given this argument, I 
would say that it is very much in line with Carnes and Hansen, where these more educated, 
professional candidates would stand a better chance up against blue-collar workers.  In minority 
communities, though their political resources still may not rival those of other groups, they 
certainly have the qualifications and only need the extra enticement from a more professional 
legislature to run and win election.            
 Geographic considerations are also important to the story, but measurement of these 
geographic variables cause a problem in the model.  I hypothesize on the relationships between 
urban percentages, minority state percentages, and their interactions.  As the literature mentioned 
throughout the paper suggests, geographic concentration is a complicated story and one further 
complicated by multicollinearity.    
Several implications follow from the inconsistent results on geographic location.   First, 
perhaps the Voting Rights Act is enforced differently under different presidential administrations 
and would yield a different result.  For example, the preclearance process might look much 
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different under the Obama administration than under the Bush administration, the one examined 
here.  This thought serves as a potential topic for future research.  Second, urban concentration, 
as measured by the United States Census, may not be the best measure of concentration.  
Pinpointing the correct measurement of this concentration deserves much careful consideration 
because this concentration undoubtedly belongs in the story on minority representation.  
Considering the level of professionalism becomes possible for minorities because they have a 
real chance of winning in districts with higher levels of minority voters.  Teasing out the 
problems over geographic concentration would further many aspects of the political science 
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Appendix 3.1.  Regression Estimates of Independent Variables on Percentage of Latinos Serving in 
State Legislatures  
(EXAMPLE OF HIGH MULTICOLLINEARITY) 
 Lower Chamber Model 
 Coefficienct 
Variable  (Standard Error) 
Professionalism 2.33  
(1.67)  
Urban Percentage -12.75 *** 
(2.63)  








Term Limits of State -.18  
(.59)  




Urban x Latino Log Percentage -293.12 ** 
 (72.20)  
Constant -4.05 *** 
 (2.20)  




F 26.93 *** 
R-squared .90  
***p .01 (one-tailed test) 
**p .05 (one-tailed test) 












Religion in Representation:  Examining Religion’s Involvement in 
Payday Lending Legislation in Texas      
 
“Trying to find a balance between consumer protection and industry regulation has become a 
perennial issue before the Texas Legislature.  Other legislators have filed [credit service 
organizations] bills during the current session.  ‘The problem is that all bills introduced to date 
will put some legitimate operators out of business,’ said Truitt.  She continued, ‘There is a 
market for short term loans.  Consumers will not be well served by eliminating these sources of 
short term and unsecured loans.  The alternative for them will be even worse.  I do not want to 
overregulate [payday lenders] and drive business and jobs from Texas, but if there are rogue 
actors out there preying on innocent people, we need better recourse than what is now 
available.” 







 In 2011, the Texas Legislature considered legislation on the regulation of the payday 
lending industry.  Payday lenders, the many storefronts around America that provide cash 
advances to consumers until their next payday, saw the regulation attempt coming; Texas (and 
many other states) attempted regulation of the industry during previous sessions but with no 
success.  Whereas lawmakers failed to pass any real legislation during all previous legislative 
sessions, this legislative session proved a little different.  Representative Vicki Truitt, a 
Republican from the Dallas-Fort Worth area and Chairwoman of the Pensions, Investments & 
Financial Services Committee, vowed to pass legislation for what she called a “perennial issue.”  
She succeeded.     
Representatives from both sides of the aisle came out in support of regulation.  Why?  On 
an issue that heavily affects the poor, what drove these representatives to speak up on their 
behalf, especially in a pro-business state such as Texas?  Many studies (for example, Gilens 
2005; Berinsky 2002; Schneider and Ingram 1993; Piven and Cloward 1988; Gaventa 1980) 
argue that American government often excludes the interests of the poor, giving special interest 
instead to other favored subsets of people, like those representing industry.  Issues important to 
the poor do not always lose, though.  What are the factors that drive representatives from both 
sides of the aisle to support calls for regulation? 
In order to answer these question, I consider the characteristics of a representative, her 
campaign, and her district.  Certainly, this approach is not new.  Political science scholars, for 
example, have tested whether the descriptive characteristic of race leads to substantive 
representation, drawing from Pitkin’s (1967) distinction of the two.  Some found that race as 
descriptive representation indeed plays a substantive role in the level of support shown toward 
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minority causes (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Whitby 1997; Hall 1996; Hutchings 1997; Canon 
1999; Tate 2003; Minta 2009).               
Scholars have even focused on the role of campaign contributions and what they mean 
for representation.  The studies available show mixed results.  Some show that campaign 
contributions sway some legislative activities in a contributor’s direction (Hall and Wayman 
1990; Hojnacki and Kimball 2001; Austen-Smith 1995; Wright 1990; Rocka and Gordon 2013; 
deFigueiredo and Edwards 2007), but Wawro (2001) comprehensively examines the relationship 
between campaign contributions and roll-call votes and finds no real influence.       
I veer from previous studies of representation by looking at another important factor that 
might drive a legislator’s decision—religion.  Payday lending, painted by opponents as providing 
the poor with access to “debt, not credit” (Center for Responsible Lending 2001), forces 
representatives to come to grips with the issue as religious constituents advocate for regulation of 
payday lenders.  I draw from Fenno’s (1977) landmark study on representatives and their 
interactions with constituents back in the district.  I argue that religion is another way that 
legislators signal to constituents that the legislators are just like their constituents.  By doing so, 
these legislators open themselves up to targeting, as payday lending became an issue that 
religious groups have claimed as their own.  Like the group consciousness of race or gender (see 
Dawson 1994; Mansbridge 1999), religious groups seek out fellow religious representatives as 
advocates for their causes.  In order to appease their constituency, represent an authentic 
perception to their constituency, and grow political support within it, these representatives 
oblige. Specifically, I focus on a legislator’s publicly professed religion as a driver of her 
decision to participate in legislative deliberations.  My study drills down into legislative 
deliberations of the Texas House of Representatives during the 2011 legislative session.  I treat 
77 
 
their professed religion as an indicator of how they will approach the regulation of the payday 
lending industry. 
I utilize speaking time and roll-call votes to assess representatives’ responsiveness on 
payday lending regulation.  Like Minta (2009) and Hall and Heflin (1994), I choose speaking 
time because this more time-consuming measure also gauges intensity, an often understated 
quality missed by roll-call votes.  Those that speak out show an intensity to really argue on 
behalf of a particular cause and to support in a stronger way issues that are important to their 
constituents.      
I find that those representatives with a professed religion on their biography do not have a 
greater likelihood of voting in favor of payday lending regulation.  However, I find that 
campaign contributions, perhaps a signal of intensity toward regulation, drives up the speaking 
time in favor of regulation.  Representatives from safe districts, women, and Democrats all 
provide support for regulation.  I later discuss the results of the two different tests and the 
implications left from these results.       
 The next sections detail the ways I approach the study of representation on the issue of 
payday lending.  I give a brief history of payday lending and follow it up with my theory of 
religion at work on this policy issue.  I then explain how I operationalize the variables for the 
2011 legislative session of the Texas House of Representatives.  I follow it up by discussing the 
results of the model and conclude with a discussion of the implications and lingering questions 






As the federal government grappled with the housing industry, the American states 
continued their less visible struggle with the practices of payday lenders.  Payday lenders operate 
storefronts and offer payday advances to Main Street citizens across the country.  Mayer (2010) 
captures the irony of payday lenders well:  These lenders offer services to a group of borrowers 
often excluded by traditional bank lenders, but the increased risk also means higher interest and 
other fees.  Critics of payday lending contend that these lenders’ practices amount to usury for 
the unfavorable terms they offer to citizens, ranging from high interest rates to a revolving cycle 
of origination fees.  Worse yet, according to the Center for Responsible Lending (2012), one of 
the authoritative organizations on payday lending policy and one of the industry’s staunchest 
critics, payday lenders locate their businesses in impoverished neighborhoods and target the poor 
as their clientele.   
The industry appeals to its clientele through a lending process that is user-friendly and 
that requires no collateral.  The borrower fills out a simple application, and once approved, the 
borrower submits a postdated check for the loan amount plus fees.  The borrower usually has 
about two weeks to repay the loan or to apply for a rollover of the loan, which means the 
borrower pays an extra finance charge to keep the lender from cashing the check for another two 
weeks.  According to one Federal Reserve report (Prager 2009), payday loans usually range from 
$50 to $400; finance charges, subject to different limits across states, usually range between $10 
to $20 per $100, which amounts to an annual percentage rate (APR) of 260% to 520%.   
If a customer continues rolling over a loan, the payday lenders extract even more money 
from the customer in the form of fees and interest.  Mayer (2010) cites studies showing that the 
average payday borrower in states like Illinois, Indiana, Texas, and Colorado enters into about 
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ten contracts a year.  Given the normal term of two weeks for the payoff of these loans, these 
average payday lenders spend five months out of the year indebted to the payday lenders.  
Payday loans are not a short-term solution to an isolated financial problem for borrowers.  
Instead, consumer advocates assert that they provide a short-term fix but a long-term problem, 
deferring full payment for later but offering manageable interest and fee payments in the short-
term.  The Center for Responsible Lending (2012) warns that the lack of payday regulation 
creates a vicious cycle for borrowers:   
Yet for people living in the states without payday loan protections, these small dollar 
loans continue to worsen financial problems.  Loan terms that require full payment in as 
little as two weeks plus an average 400 percent annual interest, catch borrowers in a 
turnstile of debt.   
         Payday lenders view these numbers as lucrative, as evidenced by their recent expansion 
across the United States.  Prager’s Federal Reserve report details the explosion of the industry 
from 2,000 payday lending stores in 1996 to approximately 24,000 by 2007.  To put this number 
in perspective, Subway, the largest fast-food chain in the United States, had 24,722 locations 
nationwide in 2011, and McDonald’s, the second largest, had 14,098 (Mcconnell and Bhasin 
2012).   
 While many states regulate payday lenders by either limiting the amount of the loan or 
capping the amount of interest charged, Texas served as one of handful that had no regulation in 
place before 2011, leaving its residents vulnerable to the lending practices of payday lenders.  
The Center for Responsible Lending (2012) warns that the lack of payday regulation creates a 
vicious cycle for borrowers:  “Yet for people living in the states without payday loan protections, 
these small-dollar loans continue to worsen financial problems.  Loan terms that require full 
payment in as little as two weeks plus an average 400 percent annual interest, catch borrowers in 
a turnstile of debt.”   
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 Payday lending clearly sets up an ethical dilemma, one that pushes religious communities 
to become involved in the political process.  Do they value business and free enterprise?  Do they 
value consumer rights, especially those of the poor?  The Center for Responsible Lending (2016) 
has an entire section devoted to religion and responsible lending.  The Center writes, “For people 
of faith, responsible lending is a moral concern….Clergy and faith leaders have been powerful 
voices for eliminating abusive lending” (Center for Resonsible Lending 2016).  The next section 
presents a theory of religion and how, in this case, religion might assist legislators in reaching a 
decision on legislative issues in front of them.   
   
 
Representing Religion 
 Fenno (1977) details the ways in which House members behave in their districts.  He 
discusses four concentric circles, each growing inversely proportional in size and level of 
support.  In other words, as the circle gets smaller (moves from the constituency to reelection 
contstituency to primary constituency to the intimates), the level of support for the House 
member grows. In order to grow each circle and, thus, ensure a larger base for political support 
and reelection, Fenno writes that members of Congress create a “home style,” a way to build 
trust among voters in the district.  These members wish to establish an image in the district and a 
rapport with the voters that signals that she identifies with them, empathizes with their needs, 
and is qualified to perform the job.  Fenno writes the following about image and perception:   
The response politicians seek from others is political support.  And the impressions they 
try to foster are those that will engender political support.  House members politicians 
believe that a great deal of their support is won by the kind of individual self they present 




Pieces of a representative’s image and political support may stem from race or gender, 
two characteristics long shown in the literature to building connections between representatives 
and her constituents.  Some found that race as descriptive representation indeed plays a 
substantive role in the support minority representatives show toward legislative activities 
important to minority constituents (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Whitby 1997; Hall 1996; 
Hutchings 1997; Canon 1999; Tate 2003; Minta 2009).  In addition, scholars have found that 
women are often more successful in advocating for women’s policy interests.  Women more 
likely speak up, sponsor and support issues in areas important to women, like pay equity, 
women’s health, and child care (Burrell 1994; Carroll 1994, 2002; Dodson1998, 2006; Norton 
1999; Osborn and Mendez 2010; Shogan 2002).  These efforts provide connections between 
representative and constituents and signal a level of trust on these particular issues to the rest of 
the constituency.  It strengthens electoral ties between the representative and her inner circles.  
She also hopes these efforts pull in new voters to the electoral and primary constituencies.  She 
highlights these efforts back to her constituency.   
 Fenno’s acute understanding of the representative-constituency connections provides a 
foundational understanding from which to think about the many other ways representatives 
project a particular image, build trust within the constituency, and fight for their political 
support.  First, these representatives may choose to be part of different organizations within the 
community.  They might join civic organizations, churches, or even athletic activities.  These 
activities show constituents that the politicians are committed to the same causes and passions as 
the other members.  Doing so builds up comraderies between the politicians and members of the 
constituency.  Second, even from afar, political representatives make statements and take actions 
to send signals back to the district.  These representatives put out press releases and send out 
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mailings to let constituents know who they are and for what they stand.  These messages attempt 
to build allegiance with constituents around certain causes or affiliations.   
 One perfect example of these two points is religion.  Members join churches and signal to 
constituents a core set of beliefs.  Fellow church members see the politician regularly and 
understand that the politician is “one of us,” fighting for the causes they all hold dear.  This 
behavior provides another solid opportunity for the politician to draw in supporters.  Second, 
members sometimes post their religious affiliations in their biographies, too.  While a politician 
cannot attend all the churches, a simple statement might endear other fellow religious members 
to her, even those that live far away from the politician.   
 Here, I find it important to pause and note that this identification is not one-sided.  
Politicians are not the only ones who reap the benefits of a common connection.  Representing a 
particular group or identity also comes with responsibilities.  These various groups will call on 
their politicians from time to time to represent them on issues that are salient to their particular 
identities.  This ongoing process further solidifies the trust between the politician and the 
particular constituency or eventually erodes it, depending on the response of the politician.  
Religious congregations, for example, will call on their religious legislator, their fellow church 
member, to go to bat for them on issues important to the religion.       
Once a political issue becomes a religious one, the salience of religion rises for those 
legislators that are religious.  The political issue then becomes one of shared group 
consciousness, similar to the shared group consciousness described in minority or gender politics 
(see Dawson 1994; Mansbridge 1999).  Religious groups take to the halls of legislatures 
throughout the country.  While legislature visitors of a particular religion may visit every 
legislative office, they are in particular looking for legislators of their own religion, those that 
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profess the same religious traditions as their own.  Catholic leaders, for example, turn to fellow 
Catholic legislators to support religious education, even if they are pro-public-school Democrats.  
They appeal to their shared group consciousness in furthering the mission of religion.   
How do religious groups wield this power and influence over legislators?  First, leaders 
of these churches use the power of their numbers to flex their muscle in state legislatures 
nationwide. In 2015 alone, more than half of American surveyed stated that they had 
membership in a church or synagogue (Gallup 2016).  The number of Americans claiming 
membership in these religious organizations is staggering.   This means that legislators come 
from districts with many religious adherents.  Political pressure from the massive amounts of 
religious voters or from politically active congregations may provide the added motivation.  This 
final point assumes Mayhew’s (1974) point that a politician’s main motivation is reelection.   
Religion organizes its citizens and creates powerful lobbying groups. A legislator’s own 
professed religion rises in salience over the issue.  Religion moves its legislators to vote based on 
their relationship with constituents in their home districts.   
For this paper, I focus on the religious relationship between politicians and constituents.  
Unfortunately, gathering data on church attendance for members is not easy.  Instead, my study 
expands the literature by identifying a new way to measure religion, namely by allowing 
legislative members to self-identify.  I discuss the measurement of the variable in the next 
section.  Looking for an easy-to-identify measure for religion is important because religion 
firmly belongs in the study of representation.  I use payday lending as a test of whether professed 
religion drives legislators to behave differently than other legislators.  Payday lending provides 
an interesting test because it is not like abortion, which has historically become a political issue 
involving religion.  Payday lending is a recent phenomenon, one where religious groups have 
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chosen to become involved due to its effects on the poor.  Religion has owned this issue as one 
of their own, and non-profits such as the Center for Responsible Lending have formed alliances 
with the religious community to curb payday lending’s harmful practice.  These religious 
constituents place pressure on their constituents to vote in favor of regulation.  In sum, I expect 
those legislators who profess a religion to be more likely than other legislators to intervene in 
favor of regulation of payday lenders.  These legislators will draw on their own religion in 
support of regulation because they will receive pressure from their religious constituents to 
provide a measure of political support.   
        
Data and Methods 
I use two separate analyses to test my hypothesis, but within each model, the independent 
variables remain the same.  The dependent variables are different.  First, I use a standard 
regression to test the amount of speaking time taken by members of the House of 
Representatives during the 2011 legislative session.  I detail this dependent variable in its own 
section.  Second, I use a probit model to test the vote choice of House members on House Bill 
2594, one of two payday lending-related bills to pass both chambers and make its way into law.  
According to the Center for Public Policy Priorities (2011), House Bill 2594 is the stricter of the 
two bills, requiring payday storefronts to be registered and licensed with the Office of Consumer 
Credit Commissioner.  House Bill 2592 simply forces storefronts to display notice and disclosure 
requirements.  While roll-call votes are not always perfect indicators of intensity, they certainly 
provide important information as I unpack the meaning of the results for each independent 
variable.          
Dependent Variables:  Speaking Time and Roll-Call Vote 
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 “Although I wish that we could pass a bill that would do more to protect consumers, I support 
this legislation because I believe it is the most we can accomplish this session, and it represents 
a significant improvement over current law.” 
Rep. Marc Veasey (D), 2011 
 
 
“It’s awful, it does nothing.  It doesn’t take care of the problems.  It doesn’t fix the loophole 
between the consumer credit office, so it really doesn’t do anything.” 
Rep. Tom Craddick (R), 2011 
The two quotes listed above are quotes from supporters of payday lending regulation.  All 
refer to the bills that eventually passed through committee, onto the floor, and into law.  They 
also highlight the problems with depending solely on roll-call votes.  Only one, Representative 
Veasey, voted for House Bill 2594; Representative Craddick did not.  Representative Craddick 
authored his own bill, and when a lesser bill was passed through committee and reached the full 
floor, he could not support it.  He felt like the bill did not go far enough.  If we only considered 
the roll-call votes, it would appear as if Craddick were anti-regulation.  He was not.  He wanted 
the fullest regulation of the industry.  Roll-call votes do not expose all the nuances for voting 
decisions the way speaking time does.  The quotes above certainly imply why roll-call votes are 
not a perfect measure of preferences.  One of the best ways to uncover true policy preference is 
to evaluate statements of representatives.  It was not until both representatives made the 
statements above that one understands their stance on the issue.         
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What influences a legislator’s decision to support payday lending regulation?  How 
should support for payday lending be measured?  This project certainly considers the importance 
of roll-call votes but also moves away from the traditional consideration of roll-call votes.  In 
this section, I discuss the model concerning speaking time.  I then discuss the results of the 
model.  I follow up the results of this model with the model on roll-call votes.   
Roll-call votes tell us something about preferences but not too much about intensity.  Hall 
(1996) encourages students of Congress to explore the many other ways legislators participate in 
the policy process.  He explores when and why members of Congress participate in committee 
deliberations, for example.  Here, I consider the amount of time spent on deliberations in 
committee and on the floor.   
Those legislators most interested in payday lending may actively pursue regulation 
through these more intense legislative actions.  Both types of actions certainly take more effort, 
and regardless of outcome, participating in these two types of actions sends a clear message to 
constituents on where a representative stands and sets up important credit-claiming opportunities, 
much in line with Mayhew (1974).  Standing up to speak in favor or against regulation is a 
stronger message than simply voting for it.   
In 2011, the Texas House took up payday lending regulation.  Although the Texas 
Legislature debated regulation the previous session, the state still had not passed any regulation.  
This session proved different.  With the help of Representative Vicki Truitt, chairwoman of the 
committee, the legislature passed two bills.  Of course, not all representatives participated 
equally in the deliberations surrounding regulation.  In order to gather how these representatives 
differed and to understand the reasons why, I focus my attention on the amount of time a 
representative spoke out for or against regulation.   
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To gather data on the speaking time in favor or regulation, I consider all public 
deliberations that took place during the 2011 legislative session surrounding payday lending.  
The Texas House considered seven bills in all and held hearings in both committee and on the 
floor.  All seven bills were considered in committee on the same day, and three bills made their 
way to the House floor.  I measure regulation intensity by listening to all hearings on payday 
lending, timing a legislator’s remarks in minutes, and then determining whether the remarks are 
in favor or against regulation.  I am interested in remark for and against regulation, so I code 
those that speak against regulation as negative.  The pro-regulation speakers receive a value 
equal to their total speaking time in minutes across all the hearings, committee and floor.     
I pooled all speaking time from the committee and floor hearings in order to give all 
House members a reasonable opportunity to participate in the deliberations.  In all, twenty-four 
of the 148 representatives eligible for comments spoke up on the topic.  All had an opportunity to 
author a bill and present it in committee, be present for the committee deliberations, and 
certainly speak up on the House floor.  Of those, sixteen spoke up in favor of regulation, and 
eight spoke against regulation.  While the Texas Legislature has 150 members, the House 
speaker was ineligible for comment, and another member passed away before the discussions.  I 
include Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below in order to show the distribution of speaking time.  Figure 4.1 
includes all representatives, even those representatives who fail to speak.  The figure shows 
speakers at ten-minute intervals and moves from legislators speaking negatively of regulation to 
those who speak favorably of regulation.  124 of 148 legislators fall at this value and make the 
rest of the categories hard to view.  For this reason, I include Figure 4.2 in order to give a better 
visual of the amount of speakers at each interval.  I use OLS regression to test the hypothesis on 
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FIGURE 4.2. FREQUENCY OF SPEAKING TIME, 




My theoretical argument sits on one key variable that represents a representative’s 
religion.  To discover a representative’s religion, I examined the biographies of all Texas House 
members during the 2011 legislative session (Texas House of Representatives 2011).  When a 
representative listed a religious affiliation, the representative received a “1.”  All other 
representatives received a “0.”  Only about 33% of all 150 legislators listed a religion (all 
Christian) in their biographies.  This professed religion may be enough for legislators to 
intervene in favor of regulation.  In addition, those that profess a religion on their biographies 
signal to potential churches that these representatives might support their regulation agenda, 
which might activate a representative’s religion to act in the regulation debate.         
The remaining discussion included under this section outlines the control variables.  To 
assess the influence of campaign contributions to influence deliberations, I examine the 
campaign contributions received by members of the Texas House.  In March 2011, Texans for 
Public Justice released a report of the campaign contributions from payday lenders over the two-
year election cycle preceding the 2011 legislative session.  The report provides the names and 
amounts of those legislators receiving no campaign contributions and those receiving $2,000 or 
more.  The report does not include exact amounts for those collecting between zero and $2,000, 
so I employ a scale of the campaign contributions.  I am most interested in positive speaking 
time and believe that those receiving little or no campaign contributions are most likely to 
support regulation.  I scale those with zero contributions with a “2” and those greater than zero 
but less than $2,000 with a “1.”  All others receive “0.”7   
                                                          
7 Ideally, I would prefer to evaluate the exact amount each legislator received in campaign contributions from 
payday lender.  Unfortunately, the 2011 report from the Texans for Public Justice does not give exact amounts for 
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I consider campaign contributions to be an important control variable.  Political science 
already treats campaign contributions as an important consideration in the behavior of 
representatives.  Legislators accept these funds because re-election depends on an ample supply 
of campaign money.  The assumption here, of course, is that reelection trumps all other 
considerations, in line with Mayhew (1974).  Even if true, politicians also realize that the funds 
come with strings attached.  The problem is that the literature still finds mixed results for a 
relationship between campaign contributions and legislative activity. 
Wawro (2001), for example, writes, “Some studies have found no relationship between 
votes and contributions, while others have found the kind of relationship that reformers worry 
about” (p. 563).  He uses a model to better account for legislator predispositions and finds that 
contributions from political action committees have no real influence on the roll-call votes of 
members of Congress.   
Other scholars move the discussion away from a study of roll-call votes and to other 
areas where these roll-call votes may influence legislative choices.  Hall and Wayman (1990) 
find an influence between PAC contributions and the intensity with which members of Congress 
intervene on a PAC’s issue.  These intense measures representatives take include speaking, 
offering amendments, and negotiating behind the scenes.  Some scholars focus on the access 
gained through campaign contributions and find influence (Hojnacki and Kimball 2001; Austen-
Smith 1995; Wright 1990).  The relationship between campaign contributions and legislative 
activities does not end there.  Rocka and Gordon (2013) find a link between the amount a 
legislator receives from defense PACs and the amount of money the legislator delivers in defense 
                                                          
each legislator.  Instead, the reports focuses its attention on those with no campaign contributions and those with 
the highest contributions.  For this reason, I choose to use the 0/1/2 scale for campaign contributions.    
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earmarks to the district.  I generally expect to find that the higher the level of campaign 
contributions, the less a legislator will speak in favor of regulation.  The reason for this finding is 
because I measure influence on speaking time, not roll-call votes, and payday lending campaign 
contributions present a more direct trail between campaign contributions and legislative 
activities.  Payday lenders only carry out one function and have nothing else on their political 
agenda than to stymie payday lending regulation, providing a clearer linkage between 
contributions and legislative activity. 
I consider a number of other control variables in my analysis.  I take into account 
committee membership and committee leadership.  For this variable, I code the chair and the 
vice-chair of the committee through which these bills passed as “2.”  All other committee 
members receive a “1.”  Non-committee members all receive a value of “0.”  I expect that 
committee members will exhibit a greater likelihood of voting for and speaking in favor of this 
legislation.  Logically, this may not make perfect sense.  After all, a committee could simply 
grant a hearing without voting a bill out of committee.  However, in this instance, three bills 
reach the House floor, and two are voted into law.  The committee chairwoman is the sponsor of 
the three bills related to payday lending.  In order to pass something out of committee, she will 
ensure that enough members of the committee can support the bill.           
In addition, I include the electoral safety of a representative’s district.  Payday loans are 
still a controversial topic, no matter the party.  On the one hand, these lenders fill a void in the 
market providing a source of lending for many that do not have access to traditional lending.  On 
the other, these loans come at a steep price to the borrowers, with high fees and interest rates.  
These reasons complicate the decision a member of either party faces in choosing to participate 
in the deliberations.  I control for whether legislators are safe in their own districts.  My 
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expectation is that members from safe districts will intervene more for regulation than other 
members.  I measure safety by including the percentage of the vote the representative carried in 
the district during the 2010 general election.  I obtain this information from each legislator’s 
Texas House of Representatives website (2011).     
A representative’s support for business also indicates her willingness to intervene for 
more regulation of industry.  I use the Texas Association of Business’ (2011) score of each 
legislator during the 2011 session.  The trade association scored legislators on a scale from 0-100 
percent based on twenty votes that were cast during the session.  The twenty votes were taken on 
bills that the trade association deemed important to its agenda during the 2011 legislative 
session.  Scores ranged from a low of 26% to a high of 90%, with the average score falling at 
69%.  I expect that the higher the business score, the less likely a representative is to vote for or 
speak out in favor of regulation.     
I include four common control variables:  poverty, race, party, and gender.  I include 
poverty because payday lenders tend to draw their clientele among the poor.  I measure poverty 
by the amount within each representative’s district that falls under the poverty level.  These 
statistics are available on each representative’s legislative website (Texas House of 
Representatives 2011).  As an issue that heavily burdens the poor, I would expect that legislators 
with the greatest poverty in their districts would vote for and speak in favor of regulation.  I 
include party as a typical control variable.  I expect to see Democrats speak positively for 
regulation and to vote in favor of regulation.  In a vote, all 148 members will theoretically 
participate, and a rift will appear between Republicans on a traditionally non-Republican issue.  I 
expect race to play a role in speaking time.  Payday lending disproportionately affects minority 
communities.  Minority members of the House will speak up on this minority-related issue.  In 
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addition, I believe that women will be more likely to vote for and speak in favor of regulation.  
Texas Appleseed (Baddour 2009) reports that a Texas survey of payday borrowers revealed that 
59% of all payday borrowers were women, with many of them being single mothers.  These 
loans seem to disproportionately affect women.     
 Finally, I include one more control variable in the models.  Authorship of a payday 
regulation bill is an important control because it will most certainly affect the likelihood of a 
member of the Texas House speaking in favor of regulation.  Representatives take on the value 
of the number of bills on which they serve as lead author.  The range goes from zero to three.  I 
expect that authorship will increase the likelihood of a member speaking up in favor of 
regulation.   
 
Results and Discussion 
We respectfully accept your testimony.  I don’t see a witness affirmation form from Jesus. 
--Rep. Vicki Truitt, Chairwoman 
During committee deliberations for the Pensions, Investments & Financial Services 
Committee, Chairwoman Truitt made the above statement in jest after one of the many religious 
witnesses invoked Christ’s name to back up his claims against the payday lending industry.  
Church leader after church leader denounced the practice as un-Christian and described it as akin 
to usury.  At least one member of the committee, Vice-Chair Anchia, stated that his particular 
religion was well-represented in the group of testifiers.  Religious leaders spent hours testifying 
for the regulation of the payday lenders and spent even more collective time lobbying legislators 
for regulation.  As stated previously, religious groups are heavily invested in the outcome of 
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payday lending regulation.  They take the mission of protecting the poor seriously and did all in 
their power to raise the salience of religion in this debate.           
Speaking Time Results 
I begin with the regression results involving speaking time.  In all, 136 members casted a 
vote.  85 representatives voted for HB 2594, and 51 legislators voted against the bill.  Table 4.1 
shows the results.  The regression analysis produces a mixed bag of results.  Religion fails to 
meet statistical significance and barely moves in the expected direction.  With only about fifty 
declaring a religion and only twenty-four members speaking at all, one deeper look at the data 
reveals that six of the seven top speakers declare a religion.8  The problem with the variable is 
that two representatives speaking out negatively toward regulation also identify as religious.  The 
one who negatively speaks out the most is actually a payday lender himself, a detail not 
discovered until floor deliberations began.  He overwhelmingly speaks out against regulation out 
of self-interest.9  The religion variable is also influenced by the overwhelming majority of 
members that remain silent throughout the deliberations.  Speaking time is a more intense 
activity, and while religion may drive the top speakers to take on the more laborious task, it 
alone is not enough to motivate representatives to speak up in favor of regulation.           
 
   
                                                          
8 I ran two different models that take into account the sixteen legislators who speak in favor of regulation.  The 
others are held at zero.  Since there is an overdispersion at zero, I ran a standard negative binomial regression and 
a zero-inflated negative binomial regression.  In both cases, those legislators professing a religion are more likely to 
speak out in favor of regulation.  Of course, holding 132 at zero and having only sixteen speak up in favor make 
forming generalizations about religion and speaking time difficult.  For this reason, I do not report these models in 
the body of the paper.   
9 I re-ran the results twice, including a dummy variable for payday lender and another time without the payday 
lender entirely.  In both cases, religion still failed to hit statistical significance in the regression model, though it 
came close in both models.   
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Table 4.1.  Results of Regression and Probit Models and Speaking Time and Regulation Vote, 
Respectively 
Explanatory Variables Regression:  Speaking 
Time 
 Probit:  Likelihood of 
Voting in Favor of House 
Bill 2594 
 
























Lead Authorship of a 




































F/Wald chi2(11) 19.07 *** 31.40 *** 
R-Squared/Pseudo R-
squared 
.61  .29  
N 148  136  
*Statistically significant at .10 level, one-tailed test; **statistically significant at .05 level, one-tailed test; ***statistically significant at .01 
level, one-tailed test. 
 
Those representatives accepting little or no campaign contributions achieves a weak level 
of statistical significance and moves in the expected direction.  Movement from zero to one 
(from more than $2,000 in campaign contributions to between $0 and $2,000) is associated with 
1.01-minute positive speaking time increase.  The biggest challenge to the variable is that the 
chairwoman herself, the sponsor of three of the regulation bills and the longest speaker in terms 
of time, was also one of the biggest recipients of campaign contributions.  In fact, several 
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committee members on the committee received large contributions from the committee, even 
though they spoke in favor of the regulation.  Critics of campaign contributions and proponents 
of payday regulation may view this finding as problematic.  They may point to an attempt to 
water down legislation in order to pacify payday lenders while still appearing responsive to 
regulation advocates.         
Two control variables produce no significant results.  The race of the legislator also fails 
to move in the expected direction and fails to reach statistical significance.  Many representatives 
of color did not participate in the deliberations, but not a single one spoke for even a minute 
against payday regulation.  Nearly half of those speaking positively for regulation were 
representatives of color. Given these results, the verdict is still out on the patterns of minority 
representatives and this particular issue.  A payday-related legislative activity that might produce 
more variation in behavior might likely produce results in the expected direction.    In addition, 
electoral safety moves in the expected direction but does not achieve statistical significance.    
Lead authors unsurprisingly speak in favor of payday lending regulation.  By authoring 
these bills, they have an opportunity to speak in favor of the bills and must do so in order to 
achieve the bills’ passage.  A one-unit increase in the amount of bills authored is associated with 
12.68-minute shift in the regression line.  The result is simply a control on the analysis and 
significant at the .01 level.  All lead authors received the opportunity to present their bills in 
committee.  One lead author (Chairwoman Truitt) had her three bills passed out of committee 
and onto the floor.  She received many opportunities to speak on behalf of regulation.     
Committee membership also produces statistically significant results, this time at the .05 
level.  Committee members are more likely to speak up in favor of regulation.  Committee 
members are associated with a 6.09-minute increase in speaking positively for payday regulation.  
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These results may seem counterintuitive to some, but the results should really not be surprising.  
This is typically a Democratic issue passing through a Republican-led committee.  Give that the 
legislation made it to the floor, the chairwoman would not allow a bill through the committee 
that 1) goes against the majority of Republicans and 2) is too unfriendly toward the industry.  
This means that all committee members, both Republican and Democrat, would be willing to 
participate in the bill’s deliberations. 
Three control variables produce no statistically significant results.  District poverty 
matters very little to speaking time, moving in the right direction but producing no statistically 
significant results.  Again, the issue is tricky because the poor depend on this source of lending 
even if the interest rates are high.  The issue also provides a dilemma in that any regulation bill to 
the floor of the Texas House represents an improvement for advocates to the poor because no 
regulation existed before the two bills that made it to the floor.  However, like Craddick, many 
may not have spoken up more vocally because the bills did not go very far in regulating the 
payday lenders.          
Party and business scores fail to influence speaking time in favor of regulation.  Contrary 
to expectations, Democrats are no more likely to speak in favor of regulation, with the 
coefficient even moving in the negative direction.  Like committee members, though, this finding 
should not surprise.  A Republican-led legislature will only allow legislation that is palatable to 
its members.  In fact, Republicans authored and coauthored some of these regulation bills.  
Democrats, on the other hand, may have settled for the bills and may not have been moved by 
the bills due to very little teeth in the bills.  The business score of legislators behaves in the 
expected direction but falls short of producing statistically significant results.         
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Finally, gender also moves in the expected direction.  However, the coefficient fails to 
reach statistical significance.  Like many men, women chose to sit on the sidelines and observe 
the deliberations.  Of the thirty-one women in the House in 2011, only one spoke against, 
twenty-five failed to speak, and six women spoke in favor of regulation.  The pattern suggests 
that women may achieve statistical significance under a different test with more variation (i.e. an 
activity or a bill where fewer representatives choose not to sit out on the deliberations).          
 
Roll-Call Vote Results 
The discussion below relates to the results of the probit model involving the roll-call vote 
taken on House Bill 2594 (HB 2594).  Religion still fails to hit any level of statistical 
significance but moves in the expected direction.   
The variable involving little or no campaign contributions achieves statistically 
meaningful results but moves in the unexpected direction.  As a representative takes few 
campaign contributions, the representative is less likely to vote for House Bill 2594.  
Representatives with greater than $2,000 in campaign contributions have a predicted probability 
of .80 of voting for HB2594. Representatives with campaign contributions in the range between 
zero and $2,000 have a predicted probability of .68 of voting for HB2594.  Finally, 
representatives taking zero campaign contributions have a predicted probability of .55.  As 
previously stated, some of those receiving little to no campaign contributions may have desired 
stronger regulation.  This is certainly true in Representative Craddick’s case.  He expressed his 
displeasure in the lack of teeth associated with House Bill 2594.  Campaign contributions seems 
to have more of an impact on the issue of payday lending than does religion.  Representatives 
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choosing to accept fewer campaign contributions perhaps signal that they are more willing to go 
to bat for regulation advocates.       
The race of the legislator moves in the expected direction but narrowly fails to achieve 
statistical significance.  A quick tabulation reveals that thirty-seven of forty minority members 
voted in favor of regulation, whereas white members split their votes forty-eight to forty-eight.  
The results are still instructive and highlight the potential to uncover statistically significant 
results under a different scenario involving payday lending.       
Five control variables produce uneven results relative to their expectations.  Electoral 
safety is strongly associated with representatives voting for regulation.  Those from safe seats 
feel more comfortable sticking their necks out on policies that may appear a little more 
controversial.  For example, conservative representatives may have difficulty selling a yes vote 
to conservative constituents in their home districts.  Lead authors surprisingly moves in the 
negative direction but fails to hit statistical significance.  Again, Craddick falls into this category 
and influences the variable in a meaningful way.  Committee membership moves in the predicted 
direction, but this time, the variable fails to hit statistical significance.  District poverty moves in 
the unexpected direction but produces no statistically significant results.  Finally, the business 
score of legislators moves in the unexpected direction and hits the .1 level of statistical 
significance.  That is, the predicted probability of a yes vote increases with a higher business 
score.  This may signal that representatives do not see this piece of legislation as a real threat to 
payday lenders’ interests.   
This time, party achieves statistical significance and moves in the right direction.  The 
predicted probability of a yes vote is .99 for Democrats.  Only one out of fifty-one Democrats 
voted against the bill.  The decision was an easy one for Democrats.  In an industry considered 
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harmful to the poor, Democrats provided its stereotypical support for issues important to the 
poor.  Republicans, however, only produced a predicted probability of .29.  Representative Truitt 
passed her bill with quite a bit of Republican support, but Democrats were crucial to the bill’s 
success.   
Finally, gender also moves in the expected direction and produces a weak level of 
statistical significance (.1 level).  The predicted likelihood of a woman voting yes on HB 2594 is 
.85, holding all other variables at their means.  Seventy-nine percent of women supported HB 
2594 compared to only fifty-eight percent of men.  In an issue that disproportionately affects 
women, female legislators look out for the interests of all women. 
The results from the speaking time model and the roll-call vote vary in dramatic ways.  
One of the biggest reasons for the differences is the amount of variation in each model.  The 
speaking time model involved 24 speakers and 124 sidelined legislators.  The roll-call vote, on 
the other hand, produced 85 voting in favor and 51 voting against HB 2594.  Part of the trouble 
with the first model is that representatives may not have had the same opportunities to speak for 
or against regulation.  In the second model, each representative has a chance to voice her 
opinion.  The variation between the two activities is enough to produce differences in the results.  
Democrats and those from safe districts move in the predicted direction in both models but only 
reach statistical significance once variation increases in the second model.               
 
Conclusion 
 This article focuses on payday lending legislation and the variables that help and hinder 
constituents’ representation on industry regulation.  The paper takes on a new issue in payday 
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lending, and by looking at the issue through two different lenses (speaking time and roll-call 
votes), the paper shows the ways in which the same variables impact outcomes differently.  The 
results of my research show that campaign contributions, electoral safety, gender, and party 
influence payday regulation in different, meaningful ways.  Some legislative activities require a 
greater intensity, a passion, for the issue at hand.  Campaign contributions may signal whether 
they are willing to play by payday lenders’ rules.  These representatives may best represent 
religious communities against payday practices.   
Religion, on the other hand, fails to achieve statistical significance.  The way I measure 
religion provides a particular challenge in a state such as Texas.  One might expect that more 
Texas legislators would profess a religion than just one-third of the legislators.  Uncovering the 
reasons why some religious legislators might profess a religion while others might not is 
certainly an interesting and important topic itself.  For purposes of this study, some may have 
chosen to not speak against regulation or to speak on behalf of regulation due to religion, but 
because so few profess a religion on their Texas Legislature websites, the current measurement 
may underestimate religion’s influence.  A better way to get at the measurement might be to 
survey legislators for their affiliation with a religion and a particular congregation.  Another way 
might be to study the interaction between religious advocates of regulation and their district’s 
legislators.  This might fully capture the relationship between a representative and her religious 
constituents.   
Digging deeper into the data, though, reveals that professed religion may play a part in 
the payday regulation story.  Many of the most frequent speakers were religious as evidenced by 
quick tabulations.  67% of speakers in favor of regulation professed a religion as opposed to 
about thirty percent who either spoke negatively or not at all.  In addition, a careful examination 
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of the positive end of the speaking time distribution through a zero-inflated negative binomial 
model and as a regular negative binomial model produced statistically significant results for 
professed religion.  The massive overdispersion of zeroes and small number of positive speakers, 
though, makes interpretation of these results through these negative binomial models particularly 
challenging.  Unfortunately, the issue presented here did not produce enough variation in the 
speaking time.  Too many speakers failed to speak out for or against regulation.  As mentioned in 
the results above, teasing out the differences and deciding how to more finely measure religion 
has the potential to uncover a true relationship between the variable, legislative outcomes, and 
religion.   
 One implication stands out in the story here.  The party in power truly sets the agenda 
before the legislature and produces policies in a form that can be stomached by its members.  
Regulation is an area often attributed to Democrats.  However, in order to appear responsive to 
regulation advocates, many of whom came from religious communities across the state, even 
Republicans felt pressure to produce regulation.  The regulation only served to placate regulation 
advocates without giving them a real tool to combat payday lending.  Many Republicans did not 
feel threatened enough to vote against the policy.  This bill with no teeth failed to produce the 
type of regulation that might expose true intensities in the bill.  In order to study religion, its 
salience must be activated and intensified by a bill that truly draws out religious advocates.  
These advocates certainly came out for some of the bills that did not get by the committee.  The 
only ones that escaped were the least controversial.  Most representatives had no trouble 
supporting the watered-down legislation.  Some supported it because it was harmless.  Others 
supported it because it was the best they could get.  True intensities were not on display over the 
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This dissertation tackled very different issues within Political Science, but all three 
chapters touched on issues related to representation, institutional rules, and policy outcomes.  I 
examined the relationship between states’ campaign contributions and their influence on the 
regulation of payday lenders.  I then hypothesized that higher levels of professionalism within a 
state drive up the percentage of minority legislators in state legislatures.  Finally, I considered 
that a representative’s religion pushes the representative to both speak on behalf of payday 
lending regulation and to then vote for payday lending regulation.   
Chapter 2 shows that contribution laws matter to the passage of payday lending 
regulation.  In states where contribution laws are lax, these states are less likely to pass laws that 
regulate payday lenders.  In addition, states with unified, Democratic government are more likely 
to enact payday regulation.  The analysis also shows that women may be regulation advocates’ 
partners in the fight for regulation.  States with higher percentages of women legislators show a 
higher likelihood of regulation enactment during the next year.  Minorities and states with 
greater poverty, on the other hand, produce less regulation, which advocates might view as 
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problematic given payday lending’s impact on minorities and the poor.  Finally, the South is 
home to greater regulation.      
Chapter 3’s analyses find support for professionalism and the percentage of Latinos 
serving in state legislatures across the country.  As the level of professionalism for a state 
legislature goes up, the increase is associated with an increase in the percentage of Latinos 
serving.  The analysis finds weaker support for the percentage of Blacks serving in state 
legislatures.  Of course, the percentage of Latinos and Blacks in a state matter most in the 
percentage of Latinos and Blacks in state legislatures, respectively.  Curiously, for Latinos, states 
that lean toward Democrats are better for higher percentages of Latinos but not for Blacks.  Part 
of the reason might be where Blacks live across the country.  For example, they live in heavily 
Republican, Southern states, where leaders have been more resistant to share power with 
minorities.  For this reason, I include a dummy variable for states subject to the Voting Rights 
Act and actually find that the legislation assists Latinos and Blacks to receive greater descriptive 
representation in at least the upper chambers of state legislatures.   
Chapter 4 produces a mixed bag of results.  While religion moves in the expected 
direction, it fails to produce statistically significant results.  I dig deeper in the data to discover 
an interesting pattern emerge between religion and speaking time.  Namely, speakers for 
regulation tend to profess a religion.  Little to no campaign contributions is associated with 
speaking time in favor of legislation.  However, little to no campaign contributions show a lower 
likelihood to vote for payday lending regulation.  I argue that legislators with no campaign 
contributions spend more time speaking for regulation, and then they ultimately vote against the 
bill due to the weakness of the regulation.  In other words, those with little to no campaign 
contributions may show the greatest likelihood for or greatest association with payday 
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regulation.  They choose not to take contributions because they are against payday lenders, and 
then they may want the fullest extent of regulation, not the watered-down bill that eventually 
made its way into law.  Representatives from safe districts, Democrats, and women all show a 
greater likelihood to speak up in favor of regulation or vote in favor or regulation.          
Common themes emerge through the three substantive chapters.  First, in two of the three 
papers, women show themselves to be the likeliest advocates of regulation.  On an issue heavily 
related to the poor and one that disproportionately affects women, women step up to the plate 
and go to bat for these groups.  Women represent potential partners for consumer advocates 
interested in regulating payday lenders.  They may also provide useful representation in other 
policy areas that affect the poor.  Second, in all three papers, Democrats show a greater 
willingness to advocate for the nation’s most vulnerable groups.  They tend to support the 
regulation of payday lenders because it heavily affects the lives of the poor.  They are more 
willing to elect larger percentages of minorities to state legislatures across the country.  Based on 
the findings across the three papers, Democrats do, in fact, support the groups they purport to 
represent.  Third, campaign contributions and their laws play interesting roles in the regulation of 
payday lending.  The event history analysis and the ordered probit of Chapter 2 show that states 
with stricter contribution laws are also those more willing to regulate payday lenders.  Chapter 4 
also shows in at least one of the tests that little to no campaign contributions is associated with 
more speaking time in favor of regulation.  These findings signal a potential danger to the 







Some very useful lines of research emerge from the studies undertaken here.  Chapter 2 
show that campaign contribution laws impact the policy adoption of payday lending regulation, 
but these laws are undoubtedly applicable to other policy areas.  Some industries are willing to 
fight hard to prevent regulation and have the financial resources to do it.  The payday lending 
industry, I argue, certainly protected its interests in the story presented here.  Where self-interest 
is clear and pockets are deep, campaign contribution laws deserve careful attention during these 
regulation debates.  Some state policy areas might include healthcare reform after the Affordable 
Care Act, the privatization of higher education, the contracting out of state services, consumer 
protections against other forms of lending, and environmental regulations in the era of fracking.  
These are all recent policy areas of interest to states.  Many have interested parties with deep 
pockets who are willing to protect their economic interests.  These policy areas also introduce 
quite a bit of controversy, meaning that states’ responses will vary in very interesting ways for a 
policy adoption study. 
Chapter 2 is also interesting because it discusses the collective nature of campaign 
contributions.  In the paper and even in the introduction of this dissertation, I mention that the 
collective nature of a state’s law allows the study to capture the many ways that a policy might 
die in the state legislature.  For those states that have not passed payday lending regulation, many 
of those states have seen bills aimed at payday regulation.  How did these regulations die, and 
what were the patterns of campaign contributions?  Drilling down into the states and seeing 
exactly the patterns of campaign contributions within the state would provide a very useful line 
of research.  Do those patterns vary based on the limits imposed from state to state?  I am sure 
that payday lenders, for example, are strategic in their placement of campaign contributions, and 
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especially when limits are placed upon them, they must figure out a way to distribute finite 
resources to the right players.         
  In addition, an implication in Chapter 3 is that professionalism influences the choice of 
minorities to even run for office, not just to win positions in state legislatures.  What does 
professionalism do to the slate of minorities that pursue office?  Do more of them pursue office?  
What does higher professionalism do to the quality of minority candidates?  Future research 
could consider the quantity and the quality of candidates produced within less and more 
professional states.  I would expect that higher professionalism would drive up the number and 
the quality of all candidates, including minority candidates.  Races would become more 
competitive, but with the quality of the minority candidate also going up, minority candidates 
would still fare well.   
Chapter 3 still leaves one lingering question.  How does professionalism influence 
minorities in homogeneous versus heterogeneous districts?  Part of the argument in Chapter 3 is 
that minority candidates fare better in states and districts where enough minorities live to elect 
them.  An interesting line of research might be to find the tipping point, the type of district 
demographics and level of professionalism that might push minority candidates to pursue and 
win office.     
In Chapter 4, religion does not play out in the way I hypothesize, but religious advocates’ 
role in committee hearings and a close investigation of the data reveal that a narrative 
surrounding religion may still exist.  The zero-inflated negative binomial model and the negative 
binomial model analyze the excessive number of speakers at zero and those the sixteen speakers 
that speak on behalf of payday regulation.  These models produced statistically significant results 
for professed religion and its influence on positive speaking time.  However, the concern 
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becomes the few representatives who spoke up on behalf of regulation.  Sixteen pro-regulation 
speakers make generalizations from the current data difficult.  Future research would entail 
gathering more data for those that speak up on regulation.  The research could take two different 
directions.  First, I could look at payday lending deliberations across states in order to create a 
larger pool of speakers.  I could then take a look at the positive and negative sides of speaking 
separately and run negative binomial models to test the religion hypothesis.  In the negative 
speaking time model, I would expect professed religion to produce a lower likelihood of 
speaking against religion.  In the positive speaking time model, I expect professed religion to 
produce a higher likelihood of speaking for religion.   
Second, thinking more broadly about regulation and the protection of the poor could 
expand my study to other policy areas and other committees.  The Texas House of 
Representatives takes up legislation on a host of topics each legislative session.  Other 
committees handle issues important to vulnerable groups, like the elderly or children.  
Committees sometimes even take up similar issues within their realms of jurisdiction.  One 
example could be children’s poverty in committees like education and health and human 
services.  Pooling speaking time for these committees would provide more opportunities for 
members of the legislature to speak.  For example, some other areas of research might be elderly 
health programs, children’s health programs, child abuse, homelessness, or domestic abuse.  
Religious congregations may become involved in these issues if they view current practices as 
unjust to vulnerable populations.     
Finally, the research in Chapter 4 assumes that representatives with professed religions 
interact with religious advocates of regulation.  This assumption is important in order to 
understand why professed religion matters.  I provide a little evidence from committee 
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deliberations that representatives and religious advocates interacted.  In order to follow up this 
research and provide proof of communication, future research could entail interviews with both 
representatives and religious advocates to see if this assumption is correct.                          
 
